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SCHOOLING THE SUPREME COURT
CHRISTINE KEXEL CHABOT

t

ABSTRACT

Supreme Court Justices' uniform professional backgrounds have
drawn increasing criticism. Yet it is unclear how diverse professional
training would affect the Court's decisions. This Article offers the first
empirical analysis of how Justices with diverse professional training
vote: It examines a unique period when Justices with formal legal education sat with Justices who entered the profession by reading the law
alone.
The study finds that Justices' levels of agreement and politically independent voting vary significantly according to their professional training. In cases which divided the Court, Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education (1) voted together more often and (2) voted more
independently of their appointing presidents' ideologies than Justices
without this background.
These findings substantially qualify earlier views on the desirability
of Justices without formal legal education. Diversity in professional
training is consistent with calls for a more politically responsive Court. It
does not support arguments for an optimally diverse group of decisionmakers, however, unless one is also willing to accept diminished political
independence that has been shown to accompany diverse professional
training.
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SCHOOLING THE SUPREME COURT
INTRODUCTION

Currently, the Supreme Court is comprised of Justices with more
homogeneous professional training than ever before.' Although the Justices' cookie-cutter backgrounds have drawn increasing criticism, 2 it is
unclear how appointing Justices with diverse professional training would
affect the Court's decisions. This Article offers the first empirical analysis of how Justices with diverse professional training vote. It examines a
unique period when Justices with formal legal education sat with Justices
who entered the profession by reading the law alone.
The study finds that Justices' levels of agreement and politically independent voting vary significantly according to their professional training. In cases which divided the Court, Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education (1) voted together more often and (2) voted more
independently of their appointing presidents' ideologies than Justices
without this background. These findings substantially qualify earlier
views on the desirability of Justices without formal legal education.
Calls for appointment of Justices without formal legal education reflect different conceptions of the Court.3 The view that the Court's deci4
sions track public opinion, for example, supports scholars' claims that a
Court comprised entirely of formally educated lawyers will stray too far
from popular will. 5 Other scholars find legal training irrelevant to resolving the sliver of exceptionally difficult cases that the Court hears. 6 These
1.

Benjamin H. Barton & Emily Moran, Measuring Diversity on the Supreme Court with Bi-

odiversity Statistics, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (2013) (contrasting an extremely low

level of educational diversity on the current Court with higher historical levels). Some also note
current Justices lack diverse professional experience in positions held before they were appointed to
the bench. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012)
("[T]he current Supreme Court is the first in U.S. history to lack even a single member who ever
served in elected office."); see also Tracey E. George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background
Theory and the Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2008) (noting that the initial Roberts
Court Justices "were sitting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals at the time of an opening on the Supreme
Court").
2. See, e.g., Barton & Moran, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that the lack of diversity in educational background prevents the Court from being "optimally diverse"); John Denvir, Proudly Political, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 27, 33 (2002) ("If we admit that the Court plays a political rather than a legal
function, then there is no reason to limit its membership ... [to lawyers]."); Lee Epstein, Jack
Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 903, 960 (2003) (arguing for Justices with diverse career experiences and against a norm of prior judicial experience); Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (2007) ("[I]t would be a good
idea. . . to appoint a. . . nonlawyer professional to the Court.")

3. Denvir, supra note 2, at 33; Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1720, 1731-32 (1988); Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1570-71.
4.
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14-15 (2009).
5.
Denvir, supra note 2, at 33-34.
6. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732 (suggesting that if "most appellate cases" do not involve
the "law traditionally taught" in law schools, then perhaps "some appellate judges ...need not be
lawyers"). The view that law plays an insignificant role reflects a widely held perception of the
Supreme Court. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 190 (2010)
(arguing that "legally uncertain cases" leave Justices free to decide cases in accordance with their
"political views"); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 293 (2008) ("[T]he bin containing
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scholars suggest appointing Justices with training in fields other than
law. Diverse training will help Justices decide cases that implicate
knowledge from
other fields 7 and offset bias common to Justices with
8
legal training.

Despite their different outlooks, these scholars all question modem
criteria for selecting Justices. From Justice Robert Jackson on, every
Justice appointed to the Court has attended law school. 9 In recent decades, presidents have responded to a highly politicized confirmation process by nominating Justices with increasingly homogeneous educational
backgrounds.' 0 Critics of this educational and professional homogeneity' 1 identify another limitation created by the current appointments process. Presidents will no doubt feel pressure to sacrifice professional diversity for traditional credentials, which are beyond senatorial reproach.12

cases that are ... legalistically indeterminate is chronically overflowing in the Supreme Court.");
Frank B. Cross, PoliticalScience and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 253, 255-59 (1997) (describing views of political scientists, Critical Legal Studies scholars, and legal realists).
7. Schauer, supranote 3, at 1732; Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1570-71.
8. Barton & Moran, supra note 1, at 21 (noting lack of diversity in educational background
prevents the Court from being "optimally diverse"); Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1570 ("[lI]t would be
a good idea ... to appoint a ... nonlawyer professional to the Court."); see also Epstein, Knight &
Martin, supra note 2, at 960 (arguing for Justices with diverse career experiences and against a norm
of prior judicial experience).
9.
Jackson, appointed in 1941, was the last appointee who attended law school but did not
receive a law degree before his admission to the bar. See BiographicalDirectory of FederalJudges,
1789-Present, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2014). James Byrnes, also appointed in 1941, was the last Justice who never
attended law school. See id. Since 1953, all presidents except the second President Bush consulted
the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary regarding prospective
federal judicial nominations. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:

WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 1 (2009). The Committee bases its evaluation "solely" on candidates' "professional qualifications," and provides that "[a] Supreme Court nominee should possess
an especially high degree of legal scholarship, academic talent, analytical and writing abilities, and
overall excellence." Id at 9. It seems difficult for a contemporary candidate to obtain these qualifications without a law degree.
10.
Barton & Moran, supra note 1, at 20-21; Patrick J. Glen, Harvardand Yale Ascendant:
The Legal Education of the Justices from Holmes to Kagan, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 129,
130-31 (2010) (current Justices all attended Harvard, Yale, or Columbia Law School); Timothy P.
O'Neill, "The Stepford Justices ": The Need for Experiential Diversity on the Roberts Court, 60
OKLA. L. REV. 701, 702-03 (2007) (after Bork's failed nomination, presidents turned to Ivy League
graduates in response to increased pressure to "sell" nominees to the Senate as "expert legal technician[s]"). For a summary of scholarship addressing politicization of the confirmation process in the
late twentieth century, see Christine Kexel Chabot, A Long View of the Senate's Influence Over
Supreme Court Appointments, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1229, 1240-45 (2013).
11.
Glen, supra note 10, at 146 (presidents' "mindset[s]" should be open to nominating Justices from a more "diverse" set of law schools); O'Neill, supranote 10, at 735 (calling for a return to
Justices with "varied backgrounds"). For example, some scholars have argued for appointment of a
Justice with experience in politics. Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone, The Case for Returning
Politiciansto the Supreme Court, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1356 (2010) (arguing for a Justice with
political experience); Epstein, Knight & Martin, supra note 2, at 905 (arguing against a norm of
prior judicial experience).
12.
Geoffrey R. Stone, UnderstandingSupreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV.
381,409-10.
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Before this study, however, there was little reason to think Justices'
voting behavior would vary according to differences in educational
background. Past empirical studies have found Justices' political affiliations to predict their votes far more consistently than educational backgrounds.13 Neal Tate's leading Supreme Court study, for example, found
partisanship significantly predicted Justices' liberal votes in both civil
liberties and economics cases. 14 But attending a more prestigious undergraduate institution was only weakly associated with liberal votes in a
more limited subset of economics cases.' 5 Tate did not identify a relationship between educational background and votes when he extended
16
and studies of federal courts
his study to an earlier period of the Court,
7
results.'
mixed
of appeals reach similarly
Still, these earlier studies consider relatively small differences in
educational backgrounds: whether judges who attended less prestigious
institutions vote differently than judges who attended more prestigious
institutions.' 8 This study considers a much larger difference in professional training. Historically, some Justices who attended law school, in-

13.
George, supra note I, at 1350-53 (explaining that while education is not a social background variable "consistently correlated with judicial behavior" it is "well established that political
affiliation of... [an] appointing President is a strong predictor of how a judge will vote in a case");
see also Cross, supra note 6, at 252, 275 (noting that the attitudinal model, which political scientists
have used to predict "decisions according to the political ideology" of Supreme Court Justices, does
a good job of "accurately" predicting the Court's decisions) (citing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993)).
C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
14.
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
355, 361 tbl.3 (1981).
15.
Id.
16.
C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in PersonalAttribute
Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. SC. 460, 474 tbl.1 (1991) (not
including education as an explanatory factor for liberal decisions); see also Jilda M. Aliotta, Social
Backgrounds, Social Motives and Participationon the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 267,
277, 279 (1988) (demonstrating that Justices with less prestigious legal education voted to concur or
dissent more frequently than Justices with prestigious legal education).
17.
James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor
Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675,
1715 tbl.ll, 1717 (1999) (finding a significant relationship between attendance at a less selective
college and pro-union votes by federal court of appeals judges); Michael W. Giles & Thomas G.
Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School Segregation, 37 J. POL. 917, 930-31 (1975)
(finding judges' school desegregation decisions were significantly correlated with attendance at a
Southern college or law school); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 374, 382 (1966) (failing to identify significant relationships between prestige of law or undergraduate education and liberal case outcomes in federal court
of appeals cases); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1464-66
(1998) (finding that elite law school attendance was not a significant explanatory factor in district
court votes on the constitutionality of federal sentencing guidelines); see also Stuart S. Nagel, Multiple Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 258, 270 (1974)
(finding that, at the state level, attending high-tuition law schools was strongly associated only with
votes favoring criminal defendants).
See Goldman, supra note 17, at 382.
18.
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cluding Justices Brandeis and Holmes, sat with other Justices who entered the profession by reading the law alone.' 9
Formal legal education was introduced to make up for perceived deficiencies in legal education of lawyers who read the law.2 0 Legal training in the university setting was designed to instruct students in "elements and first principles upon which the rule of practice is founded, ''2 '
and supplement the "mere details and procedure" they tended to absorb
in a law office. 22 Formal legal education took hold and has been common
professional training for all Justices since Robert Jackson. 23 More recently, however, some scholars have questioned the utility of legal education
for a Court whose decisions may be viewed as political or resolving issues where law does not supply a single correct answer.24 This Article
identifies significant differences in how Justices with diverse professional training voted and finds that diversity favors calls for a more politically responsive Court.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines three separate lines
of reasoning leading scholars to question the value of formal legal education and uniform professional training in Justices. It also explains how
these views align with different conceptions of the Court. Finally, it describes historical differences between reading the law and formal legal
education.
Part II sets forth empirical analysis of votes cast by Justices with
and without formal legal education. The study combines recently collected historical data 25 with more recent data 26 to analyze votes for appointees from Justice Noah Swayne (1862) through Justice Robert Jackson
(1941), and other Justices with whom they sat. Considering the body of
non-unanimous cases that divide the Court, this study reveals two signif-

See Lee Epstein et al., THE U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES DATABASE (Jan. 26, 2010),
19.
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/justicesdata.html (accessible by clicking on "Legacy Version" link)
(hereinafter Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE].
20. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1949, 1962-64, 1972 (2012) ("Academic legal instruction ....was a response to the
sentiment reflected by Blackstone that an office apprenticeship by itself was not enough." (footnote
omitted)); see also discussion infra Part I.D. To be sure, Justices such as Joseph Story and Stephen J.
Field attained greatness notwithstanding their lack of formal legal education. See HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS app. A, at 374 (5th ed. 2008). This study
measures differences in voting rather than merit.
21.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32.
22.

Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of

Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 760 (1976).
23.
See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 9.
24. See Denvir, supra note 2, at 33; Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732; Vermeule, supra note 2,
at 1570.
25.
Christine Kexel Chabot & Benjamin Remy Chabot, Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters?
Supreme Court Voting Alignments, 1838-2009, 76 MO. L. REV. 999, 1001-02 (2011) [hereinafter

Chabot, Mavericks]; Chabot, supra note 10, at 1230-31.
26. Harold Spaeth et al., THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE (July
http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php [hereinafter Spaeth et al., SUPREME COURT DATABASE].

23,
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icant differences in voting patterns of Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education.
First, Justices with formal legal education voted together more often
than other Justices, even controlling for Justices' political inclinations
and other potentially explanatory factors. Second, Justices who shared
the benefit of formal legal education voted independently of ideologies
of their appointing presidents. Votes of Justices who lacked this educational background, however, were significantly predicted by ideologies
of appointing presidents.2 7 Thus, during a period that was not generally
characterized by politically predictable voting, presidents had varied
levels of success in appointing like-minded Justices. Presidents lost significant political influence when they appointed Justices who attended
law school.
Part III explores the study's implications for proposals to enhance
diversity of Justices' professional training. In light of the study's findings, diverse professional training should not be viewed as an unqualified
good. Instead, it should be understood as a feature that favors some conceptions of the Court more than others. Appointing Justices without formal legal education is consistent with calls for a more politically responsive Court. In the past, presidents who appointed Justices without formal
legal education bolstered their ability to place like-minded Justices on the
Court.
To the extent enhanced political responsiveness is desirable,28 the
study suggests a further critique of the appointments process. As a practical matter, presidents who wish to win confirmation must nominate
candidates with impeccable resumes and degrees from a handful of elite
law schools. 29 By limiting presidents to a pool of candidates with formal
legal education, the appointments process may be understood to impede
presidents' ability to update and shape the Court's political views as fully
as they might.
Conversely, the study casts doubt on assumptions that legal education is irrelevant or associated with inherently problematic biases in Jus27. This study considers Justices politically predictable when their votes are predicted by
ideologies of their appointing presidents. See infra notes 158-61, Part II.C.I. Justices who vote
independently of their appointing presidents' ideologies are considered apolitical.
28.

John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation

Process: A Reply to ProfessorsStrauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 667-68 (1993) (arguing
for a strong presidential role and against "compromise" nominees); Stone, supra note 12, at 409-10
("A system in which presidents are relentlessly driven to nominate only the most moderate Justices
will not serve the best interests of either the Court or the nation."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Ideology and the Selection of FederalJudges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) ("[l]t is appropriate, and indeed essential, for the appointing and confirming authorities to consider ideology [in
judicial appointments]."); cf Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 299, 318, 321 (2004) (arguing Justices should be selected or evaluated using a merit-based
tournament, which would make ideological considerations in judicial appointments more transparent).
29. Stone, supra note 12, at 409-10.
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tices' decisions. Comparing Justices with and without formal legal education shows Justices with formal legal education have a distinct bias,
but this bias favors politically independent decisions. Offsetting this bias
would promote a more politically responsive Court. Moving the Court in
a more political direction is not a mere matter of error correction. Instead
it implicates a normative debate about how politically responsive the
Court should be.
This Article concludes that diverse educational background is
linked to significant differences in how Justices voted. Calls to eliminate
the prerequisite of formal legal education should be understood to promote certain conceptions of the Court better than others. Justices without
formal legal education are desirable only if one is also willing to accept
a less politically independent Court.
I. WHY ARE LEGAL SCHOLARS QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR JUSTICES
WITH FORMAL LEGAL EDUCATION?

Scholars who question the value of Justices with formal legal education have adopted three separate lines of reasoning. First, a Court comprised entirely of Justices with formal legal education may disserve certain conceptions of the Court. Consider the view that the Court's holdings track public opinion and can be updated through elected officials'
appointments of new Justices. 30 A more politically responsive Court
could resolve the "counter-majoritarian difficulty

'3 1

posed by judicial

32

review. To this end, Christopher Eisgruber and John Denvir contend
that the Court's constitutional decisions should be viewed as serving a
democratic, representative function. 33 Denvir carries this argument to the
conclusion that nonlawyer
Justices will further enhance the Court's polit34
ical responsiveness.
Second, law and legal education may not impede the Court's representative function so much as they fail to describe grounds upon which
the Court's decisions are based. If law and legal education are irrelevant
to many judicial decisions, then perhaps the Court should include some
30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374 ("Undoubtedly, the fact that Presidents select Supreme
Court justices and the Senate confirms them plays some role in ensuring that the Court heeds the cry
of public opinion.").
31.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).

32.
The difficultly arises when unelected, life-tenured Justices override decisions made by
elected officials. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartFive, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 161 (2002). Freidman's 2009 book, The Will
of the People, suggests that the Court's ability to track current public opinion mitigates this difficulty. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374.
33.
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 205 (2001) (the
Court's function in interpreting the Constitution "should be regarded as serving a pro-democratic
purpose"); Denvir, supra note 2, at 31-34.
34.
Denvir, supra note 2, at 33-34 (suggesting that a Court comprised entirely of lawyers with
uniform educational backgrounds cannot claim a broad "democratic pedigree" and speak for the
"current political aspirations of the American people.") (reviewing EISGRUBER, supra note 33).
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Justices with training in other disciplines. Fred Schauer raises this question in his account of appellate judging in "hard cases." 35 He doubts legal
education helps judges decide these cases because the underlying disputes are not 36likely to be informed by "law traditionally taught in most
law schools."
Finally, a Court comprised only of formally educated lawyers may
suffer from lack of diverse professional training. 37 Adrian Vermeule contends the Court needs Justices with expertise in another discipline to increase the Court's technocratic competence. 38 The strong form of his
argument insists these expert Justices not have formal legal training.
Complete professional diversity is needed to correct for lawyer Justices'
systematic biases.
Fred Schauer and John Denvir do not set forth elaborate proposals,
but question the utility of lawyer Justices based on understandings of the
nature of appellate decision-making or normative goals for the Court.
Adrian Vermeule offers a more detailed proposal. 39 He asserts that Justices with expertise in other disciplines will bolster the Court's technocratic competence and offset biases systematic to Justices with uniform
legal training. 40 The discussion below elaborates on these scholars' positions.
A. It's All Politics
Legally trained Justices do not rest easily alongside the goal of a politically responsive Court. The appointments process has long been
viewed as an important mechanism for updating the Court's political
views. 41 Presidents have often attempted to place like-minded Justices on
the Court, either by packing the Court with additional seats or by careful42
ly considering the ideology of potential Supreme Court nominees. Presidents have recently enhanced their ability to appoint ideologically compatible Justices, notwithstanding an aggressive Senate.43 But as a practical matter, presidents are still limited to a pool of candidates with formal
35.
Schauer, supra note 3, at 1718, 1726.
Id. at 1732. Schauer focuses on appellate judging generally, but the lack of a determina36.
tive role for law and legal training in "hard cases" seems especially likely to apply to Supreme Court
decisions. Id. at 1718, 1726.
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1571.
37.

38.
39.

Id.
Id.at 1570.

Id. at 1591-92.
40.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 379; Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
41.
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284-85 (1957), reprinted in 50
EMORY L.J. 563, 570 (2001) (arguing that frequent appointments can ensure "the policy views
dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the
lawmaking majorities of the United States").
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 8-11 (describing court-packing plans proposed by FDR and
42.
used by Abraham Lincoln's generation); Chabot, supra note 10, at 1245-46 (describing presidents'
consideration of ideology of Supreme Court nominees).
Chabot, supra note 10, at 1262 fig.2.
43.
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legal education. 44 And lawyer Justices may be predisposed to vote independently of their appointing presidents.
Christopher Eisgruber develops underpinnings of an argument
against legally trained Justices in his book, ConstitutionalSelf Government.45 He asserts Justices who decide constitutional issues should be
viewed as serving a representative, democratic function. 46 Eisgruber contends Justices are qualified to make these representative judgments because they have a democratic pedigree. This pedigree reflects their appointment by elected officials, 47 through a process that ensures Justices
will hold mainstream moral views. 4 8
Once in office, Justices' life tenure allows them to uniquely repre' 9
sent people by virtue of "disinterestedness" rather than "legal acumen. A
Eisgruber does not expressly advocate Justices without formal legal
training. He notes, however, that a Court comprised solely of lawyers
may have difficultly claiming a broad democratic pedigree. 50 He also
notes legal training may give Justices a "natural, and destructive, tendency to . . . conceiv[e] of constitutional interpretation as a technical legal
51
exercise."
John Denvir carries Eisgruber's theory to the conclusion that the
Court should have nonlawyer Justices. 52 Like Eisgruber, Denvir points
out that a Court comprised entirely of lawyers is likely to be politically
out of touch. 53 Such a Court would send "the wrong signal to the citizenry at large; it tells them that constitutional law involves technical issues

44.
Presidents have strong incentives to nominate Justices from elite law schools in order to
win confirmation. See Stone, supra note 12, at 409-10.
45.
EiSGRUBER, supra note 33.
46.
Id. at 205 (arguing that the Court's function in interpreting the Constitution "should be
regarded as serving a pro-democratic purpose"). Eisgruber thus departs from customary justifications
of judicial review as safeguarding "electoral and legislative processes" or "protecting individual
rights." Id.at 46-47, 221 nn.2-3 (distinguishing theories advanced in works such as JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), and Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998)).
47.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.2; EiSGRUBER, supra note 33, at 4 (describing judicial selection process as one that is "both political and democratic").
48.
EISGRUBER, supra note 33, at 66 (explaining that federal judges "are chosen on the basis
of (among other things) conformity to mainstream conceptions of political justice").
49.
Id. at 3 ("What distinguishes the justices from the people's other representatives is their
life tenure and their consequent disinterestedness, not their legal acumen."); see also id. at 59. According to Eisgruber, Justices should be understood to speak for the views of all people. In this way,
judicial review makes up for the fact some people's views are inevitably overlooked by majority rule
or legislation passed by elected members of Congress. Id. at 18-19 (describing how majority rule
does not adequately account for concerns of "the whole people"). This understanding, however, is in
tension with democratic responsiveness advanced by elected officials in the appointments process.
Nor does Eisgruber clearly identify an under-represented group distinct from minority interests,
which might be protected by traditional rights-based review.
50.
Id. at 66-67.
51.
Id. at 208.
52.
Denvir, supranote 2, at 33.
53.
Id.
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on which they should have no view." 54 Denvir specifically addresses
lawyers, not legal education.55 Still, formal legal training is required to
become a lawyer, and it is clearly intertwined with problems Denvir
identifies. He disfavors limiting Justices to an unrepresentative portion of
the population with a unique technical skill set.56 These flaws apply to
persons who attended law school as much as they apply to lawyers in
general.
Denvir instead hopes presidents will start appointing lay Justices in
order to create a Court of "high politics. '57 This Court could claim "a
broader democratic pedigree" and "will possess greater sensitivity to the
current political aspirations of the American people." 58 Denvir urges
presidents to appoint Justices like former President Jimmy Carter 59 or
historian Gerry Wills. 60 Thus, lay Justices offer one reform that will help
the Court "better perform its essential democratic function. 61
Denvir acknowledges his proposal might lead to different types of
political responsiveness. One possibility is that it will create partisan
Justices who act "as agents of ...political parties" or the presidents who
appointed them.62 Alternatively, it may create a court of "high politics"
which speaks for broader democratic interests and accounts for views
that are not adequately represented in the electoral process. 63 Denvir
strongly prefers the latter outcome, a Court of high politics, to a partisan
Court. 64
But he does not support his preference with a clear description of
what interests a non-partisan court of high politics is supposed to represent.65 Denvir's concern over interests which are not well-represented in
the political process, for example, may overlap with minority interests
which are typically protected by "rights-based," counter-majoritarian
judicial review. 66 Denvir fails to describe a court of high politics with a
discernable set of interests that can be identified and measured empirically. In response, this Article incorporates the more discernable representa-

54.
Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 33-34.
59. Presumably a younger Jimmy Carter: he is currently 90 years old.
60.
Denvir, supra note 2, at 34.
Id at33.
61.
62. Id.at 35.
63.
Id.Denvir includes a list of "great" Justices who reflect broader democratic interests
rather than partisanship. His list includes Earl Warren, William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, John
Paul Stevens, and David Souter. Id.
64.
Id.
65. Id. This is also a flaw in Eisgruber's work. See supranote 49.
66.
For example, some of the Justices Denvir considers "great," Justices Warren and Brennan,
are generally understood as promoting rights-based, counter-majoritarian review in constitutional
areas such as criminal procedure. Denvir, supra note 2, at 35.
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tive function identified by Denvir: the function served by a partisan court
that reflects views of Justices' appointing presidents.
Denvir's reforms also go beyond appointment criteria and call for a
separate constitutional court (indeed, his position is inspired by the
French Conseil D'Etat).67 This would be an even more radical step than
adding lay Justices to the current Court, and it would require change beyond the scope of reforming current appointments practice. Thus, this
study focuses on the first step in Denvir's proposal: enhancing the
Court's political responsiveness by appointing lay Justices to decide the
entire mix of cases before the Supreme Court.
To assess this aspect of Denvir's proposal, it would be helpful to
know what happened when presidents appointed Justices without formal
legal education in the past. Is there any reason to think they might be
more politically responsive than other Justices? This study addresses the
question by measuring whether Justices who shared the benefit of formal
legal education were more or less independent of the ideologies of their
appointing presidents than Justices with diverse educational backgrounds. As explained below, the comparison shows educational diversity is related to greater levels of politically responsive voting.
B. Judging Where the Law Has Run Out
Fred Schauer questions the need for appellate judges who are formally educated lawyers. 68 His question follows logically from the thesis
that appellate judging "occupies" a severely under-determined "corner of
law." 69 Appellate cases stand apart from most disputes, which are governed by clear legal rules capable of channeling human behavior "without case-by-case intervention of lawyers and judges. 7 °
Schauer's description of appellate cases builds on George Priest's
and Benjamin Klein's case-selection hypothesis. 71 Priest and Klein hypothesize that disputes people choose to litigate are unlikely to be a "random" or "representative sample" of all disputes.72 People tend to litigate
cases where issues are up for grabs, while they settle cases where issues
are more clear-cut. 73 For appeals, which often focus on legal issues, parties tend to pursue cases where the law is under-determined. As Schauer
explains, cases brought to appellate courts are "likely largely to consist
67.
Id. at 33.
68.
Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732.
69.
Id. at 1720.
70.
Id For example, vast numbers of people file their tax returns by April 15 of a given year,
on average people drive more slowly on roads where the speed limit is lower, and almost all arrests
in the United States are accompanied by Miranda warnings. Id. at 1719.
71.
See id.at 1723-26.
72.
Id. at 1723 (quoting George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,4 (1984)).
73.
Priest and Klein's basic model predicts plaintiffs will proceed to trial in cases where they
have a 50% chance of winning and settle other cases. Id. (citing Priest & Klein, supra note 72, at 5).
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or less equivalent legally
of cases in which both sides can make more
74
plausible arguments from the positive law."
Viewing appellate decision-making through the lens of the caseselection hypothesis, Schauer identifies "fascinating convergence among
quite divergent theories of law."75 All theories grant judges some amount
of discretion in resolving cases. When "the positive law runs out," for
example, the "positivist judge" permissibly exercises "discretion" to resolve a case based on "non-legal sources., 7 6 This is not much different
than realist claims that "positivist legal sources do not resolve appellate
cases." 77 Thus, no matter what one's theory of law, appellate cases call
for the exercise of some judicial discretion.
Of course, not all cases that are litigated and appealed fall within
this model. People will sometimes bring easy cases. Thus, a multimember court needs at least some appellate judges with legal training to
act as "traffic cops" and issue legally predictable rulings in these cases.78
But once judges dispose of easy cases, they are left with hard cases in
which the law has run out.
This Article studies non-unanimous Supreme Court decisions.
Scholars and judges view most of the cases the Supreme Court hears as
hard. 79 And cases resolved non-unanimously are hard not only because
the Supreme Court agreed to hear them, but also because the Justices
themselves could not agree on a single outcome. 80 By definition, at least
one Justice invested additional time and political capital in the case by
writing a dissent.
In hard cases, Schauer contends law plays a much less important
role. Judging these cases is not likely to be a "legal" process that values
"skills taught in the first year of conventional ... law schools."'', Thus,
there is no need for appellate judges to be formally educated lawyers.
Judicial selection might instead focus on "politics, morals, economics,
74.
Schauer, supra note 3, at 1726-27.
75.
Id. at 1731.
76.
Id. at 1729.
77.
Id. at 1730. And perhaps the case-selection hypothesis would also align with Ronald
Dworkin's views, if appellate cases tend to be those in which "two different results could have
roughly the same degree of 'fit' with the existing sources of decision." Id.
Id. at 1731.
78.
79.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 293 ("[Tlhe bin containing ... legalistically indeterminate
[cases] is chronically overflowing in the Supreme Court."); Cross, supra note 6, at 285 ("Virtually
none of the disputes that reach the Supreme Court are easy cases" (quoting Vincent Blasi, Praisefor
the Court's Unpredictability,N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1986, at 23) (internal quotation mark omitted));
Harry T. Edwards, The JudicialFunction and the Elusive Goal of PrincipledDecisionmaking, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 837, 851 ("[T]he Court considers ...many 'very hard' cases ....); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 409 (1985) ("[T]here are no easy cases in the Supreme

Court.").
This is not to say all unanimous cases are easy. Sometimes the Court resolves hard cases,
80.
such as Brown v. Board of Education, unanimously. Schauer, supranote 79, at 408.
Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732. Schauer also notes that judging is not likely to value the
81.
"technical skills of most practicing lawyers." Id.
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and a wide range of other factors that might now
be relevant under one
82
theory or another of non-legal decisionmaking."
Schauer's analysis provides an intriguing starting point for thinking
about qualifications of appellate judges. He does not subscribe to a particular theory of non-legal decision making. His proposal does not require judges to be "electorally responsible, ' 3 and it does not address
other mechanisms to enhance judicial accountability, such as the appointments process or limited terms of office.
Still, given the questions Schauer raises, it would be interesting to
know whether Justices with formal legal education decide cases differently than Justices without formal legal education. And it would also be
interesting to know whether legal education is associated with lower
rates of political voting. It may be necessary to make more of a choice
than Schauer himself makes about the desirability of politically responsive judges.
C. OptimalDiversity
Adrian Vermeule offers the most thoroughly developed proposal for
lay Justices. 84 While his primary concern is enhanced technical competence in a field other than law, 85 the extreme version of Vermeule's argument calls for "nonlawyer professional[s]" who do not have a degree
in law. 86 He argues completely diverse professional training is needed
to
87
offset common biases held by Justices with formal legal training.
As a starting point, Vermeule opts out of realist models of decision
making, in which cases are "legally indeterminate" or unavoidably political. 88 He bypasses these models on the assumption they present an easy
case for lay Justices. 89 Persons with legal training have no special expertise in deciding political or indeterminate issues. Thus, Vermeule understands lawyer Justices to have no advantage over lay Justices in deciding
legally indeterminate issues.
Instead of a realistic model Vermeule adopts "artificial assumptions," which he claims "are maximally biased in favor of pure lawyer
82.
83.

Id.
Id.

84.
Vermeule, supra note 2.
85.
Vermeule makes a convincing case for having a Justice with expertise in another field.
This Article takes issue only with his call to eliminate legal expertise. It does not question the benefits Vermeule associates with Justices who have a degree in both law and another field.
86.
Id. at 1570 (also noting fallback position of Justices with a degree in both law and another

field).
87.
Vermeule focuses on the difference between lawyer and lay Justices, but his definition of
lawyer hinges on formal legal education: a "lawyer" is a "person who has attended an accredited law
school and been admitted to the bar." Id. at 1578 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88.
Id. at 1577 (noting his argument "does not depend upon these views" that "many appellate
cases are legally indeterminate" or that law is "just politics" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

89.

Id.
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Justices." 90 The assumptions are: "[T]hat law constitutes an objective
body of knowledge; that professional training confers distinctive expertise in that knowledge; that all cases have right answers; and that judges
are (1) sincere and (2) vote their view of the legal merits."'' According to
Vermeule, relaxing any of these assumptions will merely bolster the case
92
for lay Justices.
Vermeule's right answer model allows him to estimate relative error
rates for lay and lawyer Justices. 93 His argument against Justices with
legal education depends on lay Justices' ability to offset error-producing
bias common to lawyer Justices. After outlining Vermeule's general argument, this Article elaborates on problems raised by his failure to quantify the desirable bias he believes lay Justices will introduce.
Fundamentally, Vermeule's decision to sidestep a realistic model of
decision-making hinges on assumptions about relative expertise and fails
to adequately account for the role of bias. Vermeule does not directly
address the possibility that lay Justices will follow personal political
preferences more closely than lawyer Justices in cases where law is indeterminate. Checking this type of political independence should not be
viewed as mere error correction, but as a feature that favors advocates of
a more politically responsive Court.
1. Likely Error Rates for Lay Versus Lawyer Justices
Under Vermeule's model, all Supreme Court cases have a single
right answer. This assumption allows him to estimate costs and benefits
based on likelihoods lay or lawyer Justices will err in different types of
cases. 94 Vermeule estimates relative error rates for three different types
of cases. First, there are cases where the right answer depends on conventional legal arguments and sources. 95 Second, there are cases where
the right answer turns on specialized, non-legal knowledge. 96 An example might be a tax case involving complex accounting issues. Third, there
are cases where the right answer turns on knowledge that is both non97
An example is a case turning on "evolving
legal and non-specialized.
98
decency."
of
standards

90. Id.
91.
Id.
92. Id.
93.
Id. at 1581.
94. He does not include other possible costs or benefits, such as the effect on the Court's
reputation with the general public.
at 1582.
95.
He calls these "autarkic" cases. Id.
96. Id. at 1582-83.
97. Id.at 1582.
Id. at 1582 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005)). Vermeule calls the
98.
second and third categories of cases "nonautarkic" because their outcomes depend on non-legal
knowledge. Id.
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Employing the Condorcet Jury Theorem,99 Vermeule asserts a more
diverse body of decision-makers is more likely to reach a correct answer
in a greater number of cases.' 00 Vermeule's basic model assumes independent voting and focuses on the marginal benefit of adding a single,
more competent voter.1°1 Some benefits are easy to predict: lawyers are
more likely to reach the correct answer in legalistic cases, while accountants are more likely to reach
the correct answer in tax cases involving
02
difficult accounting issues.1
It is harder to predict error rates for cases in which the right answer
does not turn on specialized expertise held by any member of the Court.
Is an accountant Justice likely to improve the Court's odds of reaching
the correct decision in a case turning on specialized knowledge in another field, such as history? Would the same be true for a decision turning
on non-specialized knowledge, such as "evolving standards of decency"?103 For Vermeule, the answer to both of these questions is yes. 14
He answers yes because he expects lay Justices to offset lawyer Justices' "correlated or systematic" biases in these cases.' 0 5 Vermeule assumes lay Justices will improve decision making simply because they
hold different and countervailing biases than lawyers. Thus, Vermeule
contends lay Justices' ability to offset lawyers' common biases will reduce mistakes in cases that do not involve subjects in which either lawyer or lay Justices have expertise. °6
Vermeule's concern over lawyers' correlated biases also leads him
to disfavor dual-competent Justices with a degree in law and another
field. 10 7 A dual-competent Justice would share the same systematic biases held by other Justices with formal legal education. Vermeule argues
the Court would be better off with a°8Ph.D. economist or some other professional who has no legal training.'

99. Id. at 1586 (citing MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF
PROBABILITY THEORY TO PLURALITY DECISION-MAKING (1785), reprinted in CONDORCET:
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL THEORY (lain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds. &
trans., 1994)). The Theorem is essentially a law of large numbers. Vermeule emphasizes certain
diversity benefits that may flow from larger groups of voters-increases in average competence and
correction for systematic biases held by smaller groups. Id. He does not argue, however, that the
Court should have more than nine Justices.
100.
Id.
101.
Id. at 1589.
102.
Vermeule also notes lay Justices may have broader beneficial effects on the Court: they
may enlighten their colleagues, receive deference from their colleagues, or help the Court write more
carefully-reasoned opinions within their particular area of expertise. See id. at 1594-97.
103.
Id. at 1587, 1589-90 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 561).
104.
Id. at 1591.

105.

Id. at 1589-90.

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1588-89.
Id. at 1598.
Id. at 1611. He lists Harvard economics professor Andrei Schleifer as potential nominee.
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2. Bias and Voting According to One's Political Inclinations
Correction of error-producing bias, then, is central to Vermeule's
argument: "[O]ptimal design of a decisionmaking group must consider
not only voters' competence ... but also the nature and direction of their
biases where they do make mistakes."' 1 9 Vermeule argues that Justices
without legal training are needed to offset biases held by lawyers. 110
Vermeule notes, for example, that as a group people who choose to
attend law school and become lawyers may favor "conventional morality," lack concern for "social justice," and prefer "cumbersome .. .processes for generating policy."'' While in theory these biases may be
worrisome, Vermeule ultimately professes "uncertainty" about the systematic nature of these biases for lawyers.1 2 He nevertheless advocates
diversity on the assumption that lay Justices will provide different and
countervailing biases. 13
But Vermeule's assumptions about benefits flowing from biases
held by lay Justices are untested and uncertain. He does not quantify or
elaborate on the direction of helpful, offsetting bias that he expects lay
Justices to introduce. He assumes any difference in professional training
will do, so that in terms of bias correction alone, the Court could benefit
just as much from appointment 4of an "astrologer" as it could from appointment of a PhD economist."
Without specifics, however, it is difficult to accept that the bias introduced by a nonlawyer professional-whom Vermeule prefers to the
astrologer because of her enhanced technological competence-will have
a desirable effect. It may be that Justices with training in another profession share many of the biases held by legal professionals. The critical
"in-group," in other words, may be white-collar professionals who hold
5
advanced degrees from elite institutions."
More fundamentally, Vermeule's failure to identify desirable biases
introduced by lay Justices raises questions about his decision to skirt
realistic models of decision making. Recall that Vermeule's right answer
109.
110.

Id. at 1589.
Id. at 1591

("[L]ay Justices lack the systematic biases .. .that arise from lawyers' com-

mon professional training.").
Id. at 1588 n. 56 (citing studies).
Ill.
112.

Id. at 1593-94 ("We lack essential knowledge about ...

the degree to which lawyers'

").
biases are correlated ....
Id. at 1605-06.
113.
Id. at 1611 ("[A]ppointing an astrologer to the Court might dilute lawyerly biases ... .
114.
115.
Consider Riley v. California,in which a unanimous Court held that police may not search
a person's cellphone without a warrant. 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). The Justices' ability to relate
to privacy concerns arising from cellphone searches has led to the case being described as a "yuppie"
spin on search and seizure law. Nina Totenberg, Rare Unanimity in Supreme Court Term, With
PM),
3:12
6,
2014,
(July
RADIO
PUBLIC
of Fireworks, NATIONAL
Plenty
http://www.npr.org/2014/07/06/329235293/rare-unanimity-in-supreme-court-term-with-plenty-of-

fireworks (internal quotation marks omitted).
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framework sidestepped realistic models of decision-making based solely
on considerations of relative expertise. He assumes that legal training
confers no superior expertise where law is indeterminate.11 6 But these
assumptions obscure important considerations of bias. Although legal
expertise may not play much role in a realistic model, bias still seems
relevant, and is perhaps even more relevant to how Justices resolve indeterminate or inherently political issues.
In the real world-where many cases do not have a single right answer-it may be that legal training is nevertheless associated with distinct biases omitted by Vermeule. That is, legally trained judges may be
more inclined to decide cases independently of their personal political
inclinations. This potential bias implicates a normative debate over how
political or independent judges should be.117 A proposal that offsets or
mitigates politically independent voting should not be viewed as mere
error correction. Instead, attempting to offset or mitigate independent
decision-making favors one side of a normative debate about the nature
of the Court.
To assess Vermeule's call for Justices without formal legal education, then, it would be helpful to know whether Justices who attended
law school are more or less politically independent than other Justices.
At least some scholars would find proposals to enhance political voting
problematic, and likely more worrisome than in-group biases held by
lawyers. In this case, perhaps dual-competent Justices, who have expertise in both law and another field, might offer a better tradeoff than Vermeule originally assumes.
D. HistoricalDifferences in Legal Education
The proposals above all question the need for Justices with formal
legal education. This study considers empirical evidence from a unique
historical period when the Court had a mix of Justices with and without
formal legal education. These Justices' varied educational backgrounds
reflect a transition in legal education in the United States. Before admission to the bar required a law degree, it required aspiring lawyers to
spend a fixed period of time reading the law." 8 Many lawyers satisfied

116.
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1577. This is similar to Schauer's position that legal training
does not matter in indeterminate cases. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 1732.
117.
Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV 2464, 2492 (2014) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013)) (noting "normative" debate in which "[flormalists
argue that law should play a greater role in judging" whereas "realists" contend "policy preferences
should trump formal considerations").
118.
ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW
82-84 (1921).
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this requirement by apprenticing under the supervision of a practicing
lawyer, without attending law school.1 1 9
The apprenticeship system "left much to be desired. 1 2 0 While apprentices gained valuable exposure to "professional tradition[s]" as well
as relationships with established attorneys,12 it was difficult to find time
for the systematic study of law in a busy office. Law clerks tended to
spend a great deal of time "copying writs" with "little opportunity for
constructive reading."'' 22 They were often "left alone" to wade through
opaque law books while their "teacher[s] tended to business."'123 Although some aspiring lawyers had better experiences, "[a]s a rule" practicing lawyers did not have time to "pay much attention" to their students. 124
Sir William Blackstone' 25 spearheaded reform by arguing that "the
study of law should be undertaken at the university.' 26 According to
Blackstone, apprenticeship would leave a lawyer "uninstructed in the
elements and first principles upon which the rule of practice is founded,"
such that "the least variation from established precedents will totally
distract and bewilder him."'127 Legal education in the university setting
"principles and first questions rather
would permit students to focus on
128
than mere details and procedure."'
Thomas Jefferson led early attempts to offer professional legal
training in a university setting in the United States. He "initiat[ed] uni29
versity instruction in professional law" at William and Mary College.
In addition to courses in moral philosophy, the college included a school
of "Law and Polic[y]," which was chaired by Chancellor George

Id. Of the Justices who did not attend law school, only Samuel Freeman Miller and James
119.
Byrnes were self-taught. Other Justices who did not attend law school read the law by apprenticing
with a practicing attorney. See Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supranote 19.
120.
A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1949, 1962 (2012).
121.
Roscoe Pound, The Law School and the Professional Tradition, 24 MICH. L. REV. 156,
158 (1925); see also A. Christopher Bryant, Reading the Law in the Office of Calvin Fletcher. The
Apprenticeship System and the Practice of Law in Frontier Indiana, I NEV. L.J. 19, 22 (2001).
122.
Charles R. McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124, 128 (1976).
123.
Id. at 133.
124.
CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 166 (1911).
Blackstone authored Commentaries on the Laws of England, which also became a highly
125.
influential treatise in the United States. Nolan, supra note 22, at 735-37.
126.
Nolan, supra note 22, at 760. Although apprentices may have had opportunities to take
undergraduate courses in "moral philosophy," they seem ill-suited to Blackstone's desire for enhanced professional training. Mark Warren Bailey, Early Legal Education in the United States:
Natural Law Theory and Law as a Moral Science, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 318 (1998). The moral
philosophy courses "lacked the specifics necessary to prepare lawyers for [law] practice." Id.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32.
127.
128.
Nolan, supra note 22, at 760. Although Blackstone's hope for separate schools of law
"never came to fruition in England... it did obtain acceptance many years later in the United
States." Id.
REED, supra note 118, at 116.
129.
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Wythe. 3 ° Wythe's course covered professional law, required students to
read Blackstone, and also
offered opportunities to participate in moot
3
'
legislatures.'
and
courts
By 1784, the first American school of law, "organized strictly to
prepare students to be lawyers, and distinct from a general bachelor's
degree course," was established in Litchfield, Connecticut.' 32 Judge Tapping Reeve organized the Litchfield Law School to accommodate an
overflow of students in his law office. Judge Reeve's fourteen-month
course used Blackstone's Commentaries and covered topics running the
gamut of private law.' 33 His program's distinctive feature was systematic, daily lectures.' 34 The school closed shortly after Reeve's death, when
it began to struggle "to compete with the newly opened
law programs at
35
Harvard, Columbia, Yale," and other universities.
University law schools originally "offered one- to two-year courses
of study consisting of lectures and readings of treatises in . . . areas of
law considered important at the time."' 36 Decades later, Christopher Columbus Langdell "became the Dane Professor and Dean at the Harvard
Law School" and "ushered in several innovations that characterize the
modem American law school."' 137 Although shifts to the case and Socratic methods promoted inductive reasoning and changed students' educational experiences, the program
continued to emphasize formal study of
38
law in an academic setting.'
As this history makes clear, formal legal education evolved over
time and was not as standardized as it is today. Formal legal education of
Justices in this study ranged from Litchfield's treatise-style lectures to
Harvard's case method. 39 Notwithstanding the variety of educational
offerings, however, formal legal education offered students regular and
systematic instruction in general principles of law. 14 Law schools were

130.
Id.
131.
Id. at 116-17. John Marshall, who sat on the Court before the period covered by this
study, participated in this program. Id. at 116-17 n.2.
132.
Steve Sheppard, An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall, in I THE HISTORY
OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999); see also REED,
supra note 118, at 129 n.3.
133.
Id.
134.
REED, supranote 118, at 131.
135.
Sheppard, supra note 132, at 13.
136.
Spencer, supra note 120, at 1969 (describing how topics included "constitutional law,
American jurisprudence, English common law, equity, pleading, evidence, bailments, insurance,
bills and notes, partnerships, domestic relations, conflict of laws, sales, and real property").
137.
Id. at 1973.
138.
Id. at 1974. Historically, law schools did not focus on practice skills because they were
taught in law office apprenticeships that often followed law school. Id. at 1972.
139.
For example, Ward Hunt attended Litchfield Law School, while Louis Brandeis attended
Harvard Law School in the 1870s, as it was transitioning to the Socratic method under Dean Langdell. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 9; Spencer, supra note 120, at 1973 (noting transi-

tion occurring after Langdell became Dean in 1870).
140.

Sheppard, supra note 132, at 13.
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designed to make up for perceived deficiencies in legal education of
lawyers who read the law alone. It follows that people who chose to attend law school may better understand or appreciate some aspects of law
141
than people who entered the profession by reading the law alone.
The study does not attempt to disentangle alternative reasons why
Justices who attended law school may vote differently than others. It
could be law school attendees gained more knowledge of the law, or it
could be that they simply value law taught in school more than others.
Either reason would provide a basis to reconsider the wisdom of eliminating formal legal education as a prerequisite for the Supreme Court.
1I.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This section examines how Justices with and without formal legal
education voted. It reports empirical analysis of voting data from a
unique period when Justices who attended law school sat with Justices
who entered the profession by reading the law alone. Specifically, the
analysis measures whether common background in formal legal education explains why some Justices agreed more than others, even controlling for political inclinations and other alternative explanations for their
agreements. It also identifies whether Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education voted more or less politically than others.
The results are striking. First, Justices with formal legal education
agreed with one another significantly more than they agreed with other
Justices.142 When considered alongside Justices' political inclinations and
several other potentially explanatory variables, common background in
formal legal education is the only significant predictor of Justices'
votes. 143
Second, political voting patterns differ significantly for Justices
with different educational backgrounds. Justices who attended taw
school were less politically predictable than other Justices. 144 Ideologies
of appointing presidents predict agreements with Justices who did not
votes
attend law school, but they lack significant predictive power over
45
education.
legal
formal
of
benefit
the
share
who
cast by Justices
The sections immediately below provide an overview of data and
methodology supporting these findings. Readers who wish to skip this

141.
This study focuses on attendance at law school rather than earning a law degree. During
the historical period covered here, many more Justices attended law school than earned law degrees.
Attending law school for a shorter period could still establish important differences: Justices may
still gain more information about general principles of law during their initial period of study, and
enrollment might indicate greater concern for law taught in law school.
142.
See infra note 185 and Figure 1.
See infra note 185 and Figure 1.
143.
See infra note 186 and Figure 2.
144.
See infra note 186 and Figure 2.
145.
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background and proceed directly to results should consult the Results
section beginning in PartII. G.
A. Data
This study draws on a unique historical data set that records every
time two Justices who sat together agreed or disagreed in a vote on the
judgment of non-unanimous cases decided from 1862 to 1949.146 When
combined with more recent voting records reported in the Spaeth United
States Supreme Court Database, 47 the data record voting alignments in
4,444 non-unanimous cases.148 The study focuses on non-unanimous
cases because they best illuminate differences between Justices' voting

patterns. 149

B. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is Justices' pairwise rates of agreement in
non-unanimous cases. 150 Agreement rates are a time-honored metric that
reflects the same information contained in a leading measure of ideology,

Martin-Quinn scores.151
This study calculates agreement rates in two steps. First, for each
non-unanimous case, it records whether two Justices agreed in a majority
or minority vote on the judgment. 152 Second, the study adds each case in
which the pair agreed and divides this number by the total number of

146.
See generally Chabot, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 1001-02. The data exclude a small
percentage of individual Justices' votes for opinions the Supreme Court Historical Society coded as
separate opinions or statements rather than majority, concurrence, or dissent. Id. at 1042 n. 142.
147.
Spaeth et al., SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 26. Agreement rates in this paper
were calculated using the release including votes from 1953-2009. The historical data set has 1,924
non-unanimous cases and Spaeth's has 2,520. Historically there were a smaller number of nonunanimous cases because Justices wrote far fewer dissents before the 1920s. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey
A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 362, 363 fig.1 (2001); Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity, the
Judges' Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. Q. 471, 476 fig.l, 478 fig.2, 479
fig.3, 480 fig.4 (1977).
148.
This study begins with cases in 1862 and ends with cases in 1975, which is the last year
William Douglas was on the bench. Douglas was the last Justice on the Court who sat with both
Justices with and without formal legal education during his tenure on the Court. (Jackson was the
last appointee to sit with Justices with mixed educational backgrounds, but Douglas remained on the
Court for a longer period of time.) Thus the data cover cases decided over a decided over a 103-year
period.
149.
See Chabot, supranote 10, at 1248.
150.
It is not helpful to include unanimous cases, because they offer no additional information
about Justices' relative positions. Id.
151.
This metric follows "some of the earliest empirical studies of the Supreme Court," in
which "political scientist Herman Pritchett constructed tables showing how often each pair of Justices was in agreement, or how often each pair dissented together." Joshua B. Fischman & David S.
Law, What Is JudicialIdeology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133,
163 (2009) (citing C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 890 (1941)). For an illustration of how it reflects the same
information contained in Martin-Quinn scores, see Chabot, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 1011 fig.2
(discussing similarities between percentages of agreement and Martin-Quinn Scores for 2009).
152.
It counts votes for a majority, plurality, or concurrence as part of the majority coalition
and votes for a dissent as part of a minority coalition.
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cases in which the pair sat together. This calculation provides a rate of
agreement for each pair of Justices who sat together.
Paired agreement rates capture differences and similarities in voting
behavior without noise that may be introduced by directional coding of
case outcomes. 153 In non-unanimous cases, for example, Justice Brandeis
agreed with Justice Stone 85% and Justice Holmes 81% of the time.
Brandeis agreed with Justice Butler in only 45% of non-unanimous cases. Note that unanimous cases do not add to the analysis because Brandeis will agree with other Justices at the same rate in unanimous cases.
Paired agreement rates also yield a large number of observations for
regression analysis. The voting records reflect agreement rates for fortyone Justices, from Swayne 154 through Jackson, and all other Justices with
whom they sit, for a total of 551 paired agreement rates. The study excludes a handful of Justices for whom no political inclination scores are
available.155 It ends with paired records for Justice Jackson, because he
was the final appointee to sit with Justice James Byrnes. Byrnes was the
last Justice on the Court who never attended law school. 156 All Justices
since Jackson sat only with other Justices who attended law school, so
their voting records provide no insight into how variation in educational
background might influence voting patterns.
C. Explanatory Variables
This Article focuses on whether Justices' agreement rates can be
explained by two variables: proximity of Justices' political inclinations
and education. These explanatory variables are described below.

153.

Directional coding would identify whether a Justice voted in favor of a liberal or con-

servative outcome for each case. While in theory directional coding could capture the same differences or similarities in Justices' votes, it is extremely difficult (perhaps impossible) to objectively
identify a single conservative or liberal outcome across all areas of the Court's docket. See Fischman
& Law, supra note 151, at 161-62; Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the
United States Supreme CourtJudicialDatabase,29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 415 (2013); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A StatisticalStudy, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS

775, 778-79 (2009); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis
of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 480, 493 (2009). This study avoids judgments involved in directional coding by looking to Justices' agreement rates alone.
154. Although Justices before Swayne also had mixed educational backgrounds, Justices sitting
before Swayne had decided significantly fewer non-unanimous cases upon which to calculate percentages of agreement. Paired voting records for Swayne begin with all Justices appointed after
Swayne, and so on.
As explained infra Part II.C.1, my measure of Justices' political inclinations is a leading
155.
political science metric known as presidential DW-NOMINATE scores. I exclude Justices for whom
no presidential scores are available: Cardozo, Roberts, L.Q. Lamar, Fuller, Matthews, Woods, and
Harlan I.
156. As noted earlier, although Jackson was the last appointee whose paired voting records I
consider, my voting records go beyond Jackson's tenure to William Douglas. Though Douglas was
appointed before Jackson, Douglas had a longer tenure on the Court, and was the last sitting Justice
who had opportunities to vote with Justices who lacked formal legal education.
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1. Proximity of Justices' Political Inclinations (POL DIST)
The proxy for a Justice's political inclinations is the ideology of the
appointing president, which has been one of the most popular predictors
of judicial ideology. 157 Though ideology of appointing presidents has
58
typically been measured according to the president's political party,
partisan affiliation offers only a rough metric of ideology. 159 This study
improves on partisan measures by using leading political science metrics,
known as DW-NOMINATE
Scores, which were developed by Keith
160
al.
et
Poole,
Poole et al.'s DW-NOMINATE scores, or an earlier variant of these
scores, have helped explain judicial behavior or identify judicial ideology
in several prominent studies.' 6' As explained by Lee Epstein, Andrew
Martin, Jeffrey Segal, and Chad Westerland, Poole's work in this area
makes a "profound contribution . . .to the study of American political
institutions."' 162 Poole et. al.'s scores account for "var[ied] ... ideological
intensity" among presidents of the same party' 63 and have been found to
"outperform[]"
parties of appointing president as a predictor of judicial
64
behavior.

157.
Fischman & Law, supra note 151, at 167 ("The most popular proxy for a judge's ideology... has been the party of the official who appointed the judge."); George, supra note 1,at 1352
("lt is well established that political affiliation of... [an] appointing President is a strong predictor
of how a judge will vote in a case.").
158.
Fischman & Law, supra note 151, at 167.
159.
Id. at 170.
160.
See Keith Poole et al., "'Common-Space" DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped
Standard
Errors
(Joint
House
and
Senate
Scaling),
VOTEVIEW.COM,
http://www.voteview.com/dwnomjoint.asp (last updated Feb. 6, 2013).
161.
LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 165 n.6 (2005) (identifying Poole's measure of appointing president's ideology as a
predictor of Justices' votes in recent time periods); CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC
SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER
THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH 117, 119-21 (2007) (using DW-NOMINATE score as measure of
nominating president's ideology and finding that unconstrained presidents select ideologically proximate Justices); Chabot, supra note 10, at 1260 fig. I (presidential DW-NOMINATE scores generally
have significant predictive power over Justices votes, even controlling for variation in senatorial
DW-NOM1NATE scores); Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and PartisanSelection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 631 (2001)
(using Poole and Rosenthal's "first dimension common space scores to measure the ideological
preferences of the appointing President and relevant senators" and finding that both presidential
ideology and ideology of home state senator helped predict court of appeals judges' votes); see also
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 166, 172-75 (2007) (using

common space scores to identify median judges on panel of court of appeals judges).
162. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306 n.4
(2007).
163.

Fischman& Law, supra note 151,at 174.

164. Epstein et al., supra note 162, at 306-07 (describing Giles' study). Studies of district and
court of appeals judges have found it helpful to consider not only ideologies of appointing presidents, but also ideologies of opposing-party home-state senators, to predict judges' voting behavior.
See, e.g., Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 161 at 632; see generally Fischman & Law, supra
note 151, at 173 74 (discussing studies). This senatorial role reflects the practice of senatorial courtesy, which is not understood to play as significant a role across all Supreme Court appointments.
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 161, at 22-23 (unlike Senators from states where there is a district
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This study focuses on how proximate a pair of Justices' political inclinations-or ideologies of appointing presidents-are. To measure
proximity, the study calculates absolute distance between DWNOMINATE scores for a particular pair of Justices' presidents.'6' The
distance between scores of appointing presidents provides a metric of
how close or distant a pair of Justices' political inclinations are.
For example, Justice Brandeis was appointed by a liberal president,
Woodrow Wilson, while Justices Butler and Stone were appointed by
1 66
Wilson has a
conservative Presidents, Harding and Calvin Coolidge.
DW-NOMINATE score of -0.612581,167 while Harding and Coolidge
have scores of 0.144168 and 0.533545, respectively. Thus the absolute
distance between Wilson and Harding is 0.756749, and between Wilson
and Coolidge is 1.146126. These distances provide a proximity of political inclinations, or "POL DIST," variable that can be compared to paired
voting records for all Justices.
Recall that for the Justices above, proximity of political inclinations
has only limited ability to explain agreement rates. Justice Brandeis votes
with Justice Butler at a politically predictable low rate (45%). This is
what one would expect from Justices whose political inclinations (and
ideologies of appointing presidents) are not proximate. But the explanation does not hold for Justices Brandeis and Stone. Their political inclinations are even less proximate, but they voted together 85% of the time.
Perhaps these voting patterns make more sense in light of the fact that
Justices Brandeis and Stone both attended law school, but Justice Butler
did not.
2. Educational Background (FORMALED)
"FORMAL ED" is a dummy variable identifying similarities or differences in Justices' formal educational backgrounds. Pairs of Justices
who both attended law school received a 1, all other pairs received a 0.168
This coding identifies whether pairs of Justices who share the benefit of
formal legal education find more or less to agree about than other Justices. The coding compares them to other pairs where one or more Justice
did not attend law school. 16 9 This study draws information on Justices'
70
educational backgrounds from U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database.1
court or court of appeals vacancy, "senators do not expect to have much of a say in... the nomination" of Supreme Court Justices); Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 161, at 628.
Appendix A infra provides a detailed description of this calculation.
165.
This study uses scores for Stone's initial appointment as Associate Justice.
166.
As explained in Appendix A infra, this is a weighted score combining the first and second
167.
dimensions of DW-NOMINATE scores.
One might argue paired voting records for Justices who did not attend law school should
168.
be excluded, as they show no variation (all zeros) for this variable. I included them because they are
still important in considering whether Justices who did not attend law school vote politically.
While it is also possible to compare pairs of Justices who both read the law to pairs of
169.
Justices where one or more attended law school, this study focuses on agreements reached by Justic-
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D. Control and Interaction Variables
Simply considering the explanatory power of political inclinations
and educational background could be misleading. It may be that factors
other than education and political inclinations explain varied levels of
agreement between different groups of Justices. To account for this possibility, the study includes control and interaction variables reflecting
other likely predictors of Justices' agreement. This section provides an
overview of control and interaction variables, and Appendix A provides
a more detailed description of each control and interaction variable.
The first control variables are Justice-level fixed effects variables.
These variables control for Justices who may have had generally inflated
agreement rates and suppressed political voting due to historical norms
of consensus.' 7' The fixed effects allow the regression to measure variation in each Justice's rates of agreement by calculating a unique starting
point (or intercept) for each Justice. The unique starting point ensures
Justices who have generally inflated agreement rates do not skew the
analysis and cause the regression to unduly downplay politically predictable voting by other Justices. Fixed effects properly focus analysis on
whether intra-Justice variation in agreement rates is significantly explained by differences in proximity of political inclinations, educational
backgrounds, or other control variables. 7 2
A second group of control variables looks to two types of professional experience: experience as a prosecutor or as a judge. Both of these
experiences have been found to help predict Justices' votes in historical
cases. 73 The third group considers three of the Justices' personal attrib174
utes: familial economic status, non-urban origins, and regional origins.
The latter two have been found to explain historical voting patterns in
earlier studies. 75 This study also considers whether familial economic
es with common background in formal legal education. Thus, the study captures whether Justices
who have common formal professional training have more to agree about than other Justices. This
scenario also reflects the most likely change in the Court's composition following the appointment
of a Justice without formal legal education. It is highly unlikely a lay Justice would initially sit with
even one other Justice who also lacked formal legal education.
170.
Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19 (variable 37: name of nominee's law
school; variable 38: law school status).
The norms controlled for here are ones that would generally inflate rates of agreement
171.
with all other Justices. Thus they would operate independently of differences in educational background and provide an alternative explanation for apolitical voting by certain Justices. For discussion
of historical norms of consensus on the Court, see generally Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note
147; Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice:Dissent, Legal Scholarship,
and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1335 & fig.8 (2001); infra Appendix
A.
172.
As noted in Appendix A, infra, results for fixed effects controls are not included in graphic results because they calculate a unique starting point for each Justice in the study.
Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 473-74 & tbl. 1.
173.
174.
Religion was not included because Tate and Handberg's historical study did not find a
significant difference between liberalism in voting patterns based on religion (Protestant versus
non-Protestant). See id.
175.
Id.
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status explains agreement rates. 76 The study draws information for all
and third group from the U.S. Supreme
control variables in the second
77
Database.
Justices
Court
Last, the study uses interaction variables to identify differences in
predictive power of political inclinations for distinct groups of Justices.
These variables control for the possibility that politics has predictive
power, but only over certain subsets of Justices. The regressions accomplish this by interacting political inclinations with two sets of dummy
variables.
The first regression uses dummy interaction variables to compare
political voting of Justices appointed before and after 1925. This interaction variable accounts for the possibility that politics does help explain
votes, but only for Justices who were appointed after 1925. These laterappointed Justices might have had more opportunities to vote politically
later appointees greater discrebecause the Judiciary Act of 1925 gave
178
cases.
divisive
politically
hear
tion to
The second regression adds different dummy interaction variables.
It compares political voting for pairs of Justices who both attended law
school to political voting for pairs where one or more Justice did not
attend law school. 179 It may be that Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education are more likely to agree on grounds independent of
politics than Justices who do not share the same professional training. A
detailed description of these interaction variables is reported in Appendix
A.
E. Hypotheses
Regression analysis identifies whether changes in Justices' agreement rates can be explained by differences in educational backgrounds,
The opportunity to apprentice with a practicing lawyer was often facilitated by social
176.
connections available to persons from well-to-do families. Bryant, supra note 121, at 26. Thus,
Justices who read the law were not necessarily from families with more limited financial resources
than those who attended law school.
See Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19.
177.
See Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 237(a), 43 Stat. 936, 937.
178.
179.
This study also includes a test in which the interaction between legal education and political inclinations was added to the first regression. The combined regression failed to identify a significant individual coefficient for either the FORMALED dummy or FORMALED dummy interacted with political inclinations. Still, this result does not necessarily mean the FORMALED variables
lack significant explanatory power: the variables may be correlated, and thus have significant joint
explanatory power that is not identified by either individual measure.
This study included an F-test to determine whether both legal education variables (the
FORMAL ED dummy and FORMALED dummy interacted with political inclinations) jointly
have significant explanatory power when considered in the same regression. It compares the difference in explanatory power of regressions with and without the two educational variables. The F-test
measures whether the regression including the educational variables has significantly more explanatory power than one would expect from adding random variables without explanatory power. This
test yielded an f-statistic of 5.5663, which establishes the joint effect of these educational variables is
significant at the 1% level.
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proximity of political inclinations, or control variables. The analysis tests
two hypotheses about the relationship between formal legal education
and Justices' voting patterns:
1. Common background in formal legal education significantly explains Justices' agreements, even after one controlsfor
alternative explanations of political inclinations and other
background variables.
2. Political inclinations significantly predict agreement with
Justices who never attended law school, but they do not
predict agreement between Justices who share the benefit of
formal legal education.
F. Analysis
This study tests these hypotheses using two OLS regressions. 8° The
first regression considers the general explanatory power of a common
background in formal legal education, controlling for political inclinations and other background variables.1 8 1 The second regression includes
the same control variables but focuses on whether Justices who share the
benefit of formal legal education vote more or less politically than other

Justices. 182
If proximate political inclinations predict rates of agreement, the regressions will yield a significant negative coefficient for the POLDIST
variable. The expected coefficient is negative for the following reason:
Justices whose votes can be explained politically will agree less with
Justices whose expected political inclinations (ideology of appointing
president) are more distant from their own. Justice Brandeis, for example, agrees with Justice Butler far less than he agrees with his fellow
Wilson appointee, Justice John H. Clarke. Justice Butler was appointed
180.
This study uses OLS regressions because the dependent variable reflects rates of agreement rather than binary (0 or 1) outcomes. It also reports Justice-level clustered standard errors, to
help adjust for heteroskedasticity, or variance in unobservable factors, which may be uneven from
Justice to Justice. For a detailed explanation of this methodology, see Chabot, supra note 10, at
1254-55.
181.
(AgreeRate)i, = a + P1 *(POL_DISTij) + 132 *(POLDI STi,)*(POST_ 1925) +
133 *(FORMALED) + 13
4 *(JUEX) + f35*(PRO EX) + P3
6*(ECON) + 13
7 *(NONURBAN) +

138*(REG) + F.
Where (AgreeRate)ij is the percentage of cases in which Justice i and Justice j joined the
same majority or minority coalition on the judgment, POLDIST is the absolute distance between
Justices' political inclinations as reflected by their appointing president, FORMAL-ED = I if both
Justices attended law school, 0 otherwise, and other variables are coded as described above and in
Appendix A. The intercept (ci) is allowed to vary across Justices.
182. (AgreeRate)ij = a, + 0 1*(POLDISTij) + 132*(POL DISTij)*(FORMALED) +
P34*(JUEX) + 135*(PRO EX) + 36*(ECON) + 13
7*(NON URBAN) + [*(REG) + F.

Where (AgreeRate)ix is the percentage of cases in which Justice i and Justice j joined the
same majority or minority coalition on the judgment, POLDIST is the absolute distance between
Justices' political inclinations as reflected by their appointing president, FORMAL-ED = I if both
Justices attended law school, 0 otherwise, and other variables are coded as described above and in
Appendix A. The fixed effects variables allow the intercept (ai) to vary across Justices.
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by a more conservative president than Justices Brandeis and Clarke, and
83
thus Brandeis' differing levels of agreement are politically predictable.'
Of course, it may be that other background variables have predictive
power that political inclinations lack. FORMALED and other background control variables are coded as dummy variables, with a 1 for Justices who share background traits associated with particular voting patterns and 0 for Justices who do not. Thus, if a background variable has
predictive power, one would expect that Justices who share that background experience or trait will agree with one another at a higher rate.
This should yield a significant positive coefficient for the dummy background variable.
G. Results
Both regressions identify significant differences in Justices who
share the benefit of formal legal education. As illustrated by Figure 1,
Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education agree with one
another significantly more than other Justices.

183.

See Chabot, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 1023-24 & tbl.3.
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Figure 1: PredictivePower of Common Background in Formal Legal
Education Over Justices 'Agreement Rates
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Estimatedfor Justices appointedfrom Swayne through Jackson and
all other Justices with whom they sit, excluding Justicesfor whom appointing presidents have no DW-NOMINATE scores.184 ** denotes
p< 0.05; p-values are estimated with clusteredstandarderrors,and error
bars denote 95% confidence intervals. N=551. Adj. R 2 =0.1939. See Appendix Bfor a detailedtable of regression results.
Indeed, common background in formal legal education is the only
significant predictor of Justices' agreements. One can be highly confident, at the 5% level, that the true relationship is not zero. This educational background is significant even controlling for likely alternative
explanations, such as Justices' political inclinations pre- and post- 1925.
The findings support the first hypothesis: common background in formal
legal education significantly explains Justices' agreements.
Beyond overall predictive power, it is helpful to consider how political voting patterns might differ for Justices with diverse educational
backgrounds. Figure 2, below, summarizes the difference between Justices with and without formal legal education.

184.

See regression equation supra note 181. For a list of excluded Justices see supra note 155.
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Figure 2: PredictivePower of ProximatePoliticalInclinationsOver Justices 'Agreement Rates, ComparingJustices with Common Background
in FormalLegal Education to Others
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Estimatedfor Justices appointedfrom Swayne through Jackson and
all other Justices with whom they sit, excluding Justicesfor whom appointing presidents have no DW-NOMINATE scores. 185 ** denotes
p< 0.05, and p-values are estimated with clustered standarderrors. The
regressionalsofails to identify significant explanatorypower for control
variables. N=551. Adj. R 2=0.2016. See Appendix B for a detailed table
of regressionresults.
Here, the difference between the two groups is significant and striking. Proximity of Justices' political inclinations has significant explanatory power over votes cast with Justices who lack formal legal education.
(Recall that the expected result for political inclinations is negative because one expects politically close appointees to agree at higher rates and
politically distant appointees to agree at lower rates.)18 6 Justices who
share the benefit of formal legal education are significantly less politically predictable than others. Indeed, for Justices with common background
in formal legal education, politics' explanatory power loses significance
and shrinks to almost zero. These results support the second hypothesis.
185.
186.

See regression equation supra note 182. For a list of excluded Justices see supra note 155.
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education vote less politically than others.
III. IMPLICATIONS

Empirical analysis identifies a significant relationship between formal legal education and Justices' agreements in non-unanimous cases. In
addition, Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education vote
apolitically while other Justices do not. These findings should give pause
to advocates of Justices without formal legal education. They cast doubt
on assumptions that legal training is irrelevant to Supreme Court decision-making.
This section describes how the findings relate to specific arguments
advanced by Denvir, Schauer, and Vermeule. It then explains how evidence from historical voting records bears on current conceptions of the
Supreme Court.
A. Independence, Diversity, and a More PoliticallyResponsive Court
John Denvir calls for Justices without formal legal education.,8 7 He
hopes this reform will help the Court serve an enhanced representative
function. 8 8 This study provides further reason to think diverse educational background will bolster the Court's representative function.
Recall that variables measuring Justices' political inclinations reflect ideologies of Justices' appointing presidents. 89 Justices who share
the benefit of formal legal education voted independently of their appointing presidents' ideologies. Votes cast with Justices who never went
to law school, however, were significantly predicted by ideologies of
90
their appointing presidents.'
Of course, Denvir himself would find these results consistent with a
less desirable form of representation: Justices who mirror views of their
appointing presidents.' 9 This enhanced representation may be imperfect
because appointing presidents may select Justices preferred by "extremists in their own party" rather than Justices "who capture the mainstream
192
of popular thought."'

187.
Denvir, supra note 2, at 33.
188.
Id.
189.
See supra Part II.C.1.
190.
See supra fig.2.
191.
Denvir, supra note 2, at 34-35. Denvir focuses on constitutional cases, while the nonunanimous cases in this study were not limited to constitutional cases. There is no reason to think
legal issues in constitutional cases will be more determinate or that voting in constitutional cases will
be less political than in other cases. See Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Measuring Deviations from Expected Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 819, 830-31 (2008). Thus, results from the general sample of non-unanimous cases still raise
questions about political voting in constitutional cases.
192.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374.
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Still, responsiveness to views of an appointing president may offer
an attractive outcome,' 93 even if it is second best in terms of responsiveness to current public opinion. Justices who reflect their appointing presidents' views would have enhanced representative qualities. Their votes
may be understood to reflect dominant political forces at the time of their
appointments. 194 And these views may be updated by every subsequent
appointment. 195 Barry Friedman describes this facet of the appointments
process as playing "some role in ensuring that the Court heeds the cry of
public opinion.' 96 Given that Justices without formal legal education
more closely reflected ideologies of their appointing presidents in the
past, this option may also be desirable to current presidents.
Nevertheless, a nominee who never went to law school seems an
unlikely choice for presidents who desire like-minded Justices. Since the
1970s, presidents have redoubled their efforts to appoint politically compatible Justices and achieved unprecedented success in doing so.' 9 7 At
the same time, however, the Senate has resumed an aggressive role in
opposing nominees to the Court. 98 Geoffrey Stone points out that the
Senate is less likely to put99up a fight over nominees with impeccable
professional qualifications.
Thus, the Senate gives presidents strong incentives to choose candidates whose professional qualifications are beyond reproach.200 Indeed,
recent appointments reflect a narrower than ever range of educational
backgrounds -currently all Justices attended Harvard, Yale, or Columbia Law School. 20 ' Harriet Miers's nomination drew criticism because

Some scholars call for broad presidential discretion to appoint Justices with more extreme
193.
views. See McGinnis, supra note 28, at 667-68 (arguing for a strong presidential role and against
"compromise" nominees); Stone, supra note 12, at 460 ("A system in which presidents are relentlessly driven to nominate only the most moderate Justices will not serve the best interests of either
the Court or the nation.").
194.
"When a party wins the White House, it can stock the federal judiciary with members of
its own party," and these judges will provide extended "partisan representation" during their time on
the bench. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001); see also Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of Ideology: A Principled
Approach to the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 147
(2009) (describing this theory of partisan entrenchment).
195.
In his seminal 1957 article, majoritarian Robert Dahl asserted that frequent appointments
ensure "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views
dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." Dahl, supra note 41, at 570.
196.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374. Friedman also points out that the appointments process is
imperfect due to lower frequency of vacancies on the Court and ideological drift. Id. This does not
mean appointments themselves have no effect, but that their influence on the Court could be enhanced if presidents had the ability to make appointments more frequently.
Chabot, supra note 10, at 1262 fig.2.
197.
198.
Stone, supra note 12, at 383-84.
199.
Id.at 410 ("[T]here is a substantial correlation between perceived [inferior] qualifications
and hotly-contested nominees.").
200.
See Glen, supranote 10, at 141; O'Neill, supra note 10, at 703.
Glen, supranote 10, at 148.
201.
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she attended a non-elite law school.20 2 Presumably, a nominee who never

went to law school would be even more objectionable to the Senate.
As a result, presidents who want to win confirmation of ideologically compatible Justices are unlikely to choose nominees who never attended law school. This limitation adds to complaints raised by critics of
an overly aggressive senatorial role in the confirmation process.2 3 Even
if presidents have generally succeeded in appointing Justices who reflect
their views, 204 they cannot further enhance their political influence by
appointing Justices without formal legal education. 205 Thus, the confirmation process prevents presidents from creating a more politically responsive Court by enhancing its educational diversity.
B. Does the Law Run Out More Quickly for Justices Who Never Attended
Law School Than for OtherJustices?

Schauer questions the need for formal legal education because he
assumes it is unrelated to the work appellate judges do in deciding hard
cases. 20 6 The cases in this study are hard not only because they were
heard by the Supreme Court, but because the Justices themselves could
not agree on a unanimous outcome. In these hard cases, the study identifies significant relationships between Justices' educational backgrounds
and their votes. Justices who share the benefit of formal legal education
found more to agree about than other Justices, and they also voted significantly less politically than other Justices.
These findings call Schauer's assumption into question. It may be
that Schauer is generally correct, the law does run out in hard cases. But
his understanding fails to account for the possibility that the law may run
out more quickly for some people than others. Perhaps people who never
went to law school are less well equipped or predisposed to abide by
potentially governing legal principles than people who attended law
school. For example, would a person without formal legal training be as
likely to concede207that a contested policy issue is governed by the doctrine
of stare decisis?

Given these possibilities, and evidence that Justices who attended
law school vote differently than others, the value of formal legal education should not be assumed away. One should hesitate before dismissing
202.
Id. at 144 (noting that Miers's "legal education at Southern Methodist University served
as a lightning rod for criticism over her nomination to the Court").
203.
Some scholars object to an aggressive Senate, which drives presidents to nominate only
middle-of-the road Justices. See McGinnis, supra note 28, at 667; Stone, supranote 12, at 459.
204.
Chabot, supra note 10, at 1262 fig.2.
205.
Presidents' appointments power is also limited by their lack of control over when a vacancy on the Court occurs. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 374 (noting that presidents' influence is diminished as Justices' "period of service is going up").
206.
Schauer, supra note 3, at 1731-32.
207.
See Schauer, supra note 79, at 434 ("Law seems almost unique in its use of authoritative
interpretations.").
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it as useless training that bears no relationship to judicial decisionmaking. Instead, eliminating this prerequisite should be viewed as a
choice about the direction in which the Court should move. Is it desirable
to call for Justices with qualifications that have been associated with
enhanced political voting? Future dialogue on this issue should directly
confront possible changes brought about by eliminating Justices who are
formally educated lawyers.
C. Is EliminatingLegal Education in TechnocraticJustices a Good
Tradeoff?
As noted above, this study focuses on the strong version of Vermeule's proposal, in which he argues that optimal diversity requires ap20 8
pointment of a professional who does not also have a degree in law.
Vermeule argues completely diverse professional training is necessary to
correct for lawyers' systematic biases. 209 This study identifies politically
independent voting as a distinct bias held by lawyer Justices. It therefore
calls into question Vermeule's assumption that checking lawyer Justices'
bias would serve only a neutral, error-correcting function.
Vermeule, of course, calls for Justices whose lack of legal training
is offset by professional training in another field.2 ' But it is unclear this
expertise would check a Justice's tendency to vote in favor of her politi211
cal inclinations. Without training in law, moreover, a lay Justice may
be less inclined to grasp or value legal frameworks that could shape the
outcome of a particular case. Again, legal doctrines such as stare decisis
may be less appealing to lay Justices than they are to Justices with formal
legal education. 212 As a result, they may be prone to view a greater number of decisions as discretionary. And, based on what happened in the
past, the proposal must account for the possibility that lay Justices' exercise of discretion will be biased in favor of their own political inclinations.
Not everyone considers political bias undesirable. Vermeule does
not address its desirability, beyond his assumption that diverse viewshere more versus less political bias-have the benefit of offsetting one
another. This may have some value under Vermeule's artificial model,
which focuses on enhanced competence in reaching the "right ani o
,,213
But it isnot clear why bias would necessarily have a favoraswer[].'

208.

Vermeule, supra note 2, at1570.

Id at 1598-99.
209.
210. Id at 1598.
Inadministrative law, for example, the New Deal vision of the agency as an expert and a
211.
political decision maker has been heavily criticized. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American AdministrativeLaw, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1683-87 (1975). Technocratic decisions made by
judges may be political as well.
212.

See supra Part III.B.

213.

Vermeule, supra note 2,at1577 78.
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ble offsetting effect under more realistic assumptions where the right
answer is up for grabs.
Introducing more political bias or checking a Justice's tendency to
vote independently should not be viewed as mere error correction. Instead, it is a side effect that is desirable only for persons willing to accept
a more politically responsive court. In light of this study, one should not
discount the possibility that formally educated lawyers are better able to
set aside personal political views.
These findings qualify Vermeule's assumption that lay Justices will
serve a desirable, bias-checking function. For those who object to a more
political Court, the weak version of Vermeule's proposal-appointing a
dual-competent Justice who has formal legal training in addition to expertise in another discipline214-represents a more compelling option.
The compromise also presents a more realistic option for future appointments. A nominee with a law degree as well as a Ph.D. in economics
may be more palatable to the Senate than a nominee with a Ph.D. in economics alone.215 Thus, presidents who wish to add a Justice with diverse
professional training and experience may consider dual-competent Justices a more attractive option.
D. EnhancedPolitical Voting and the CurrentCourt
The proposals above are all influenced by the possibility Justices
without formal legal education will enhance political voting on the
Court. The study establishes this possibility using historical evidencethe only available evidence on voting patterns of Justices without formal
legal education. One should not expect historical evidence to map perfectly into the present or perfectly predict votes cast by a hypothetical
future Court including lay Justices. There are no doubt important differences between the historical period studied and today.
Nevertheless, it would also be unwise to ignore the only available
evidence of what happened during the time when the Court included
Justices without formal legal education. The study identifies enhanced
political voting by Justices without formal legal education. And this occurred in a period not generally characterized by politically predictable
voting on the Court. Further, Justices who voted politically in the past
were at least lawyers with informal legal training. A lay Justice appointed today might have no training in law whatsoever. 216 Such a Justice may
be even less likely to reach agreement on legal and apolitical grounds
than Justices who read the law.

214.
215.
216.

Id. at 1581.
See generally Stone, supra note 12, at 409-10.
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1585.
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Moreover, the study controls for alternative explanations as to why
the Court voted less politically in the historical time period.2 17 Politically
independent voting cannot simply be attributed to generally inflated rates
of agreement due to norms of consensus or fewer opportunities to hear
politically salient cases before 1925. 218 Current proposals to eliminate
Justices with formal legal education should acknowledge that this background has been significantly associated with enhanced political voting
in the past.
If anything, changes in appointments criteria seem more likely to
enhance political voting now than in the past. Since 1925, the Court has
enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion 2 19 to fill its docket with cases involving politically salient issues. 220 Further, politically salient issues
themselves have become more divisive in an era of enhanced political
polarization. 221 And since the 1970s presidents have enjoyed unprecedented success in selecting Justices whose votes reflect ideologies of
appointing presidents.2 22 In a Court that is already well-situated to grow
increasingly political, there is more reason than ever to think Justices
without formal legal education could enhance this tendency.
Still, one might wonder whether the modem Court has become such
"political
court ' 223 that it cannot be pushed in an even more political
a
direction. This query fails, however, to account for evidence of the political independence the Court has retained. As a matter of constitutional
structure, Justices are not elected and hold life tenure once in office. 4
Nor do Justices hold themselves out as political actors. In confirmation
hearings, for example, Supreme Court nominees "have long insisted that
225
their 'personal predilections' have no place in the judicial enterprise.,
And once in office, Justices maintain the appearance of neutrality by
publicly justifying their decisions with opinions incorporating "prece-

217. See supra Part II.D (describing variables and interactions that account for norms of consensus and different levels of political voting by Justices appointed before and after 1925).
218. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
The Court gained discretion over its docket under the Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229,
219.
§ 237(a), 43 Stat. 936, 937. For a more detailed discussion of this change, see infra Appendix A, Part
C.2.
Justices today also have more clerks than in the past. It is not clear this would alter the
220.
way Justices without formal legal education decide cases. First, a Justice would need to decide she
wants to hire a clerk with a degree in law rather than another field. Second, adding clerks would only
matter if lay Justices vote differently based on diminished understanding of the law. If these Justices
grasp competing legal arguments but simply value the law less, it is unclear law clerks would make a
difference.
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold. The Causes of HyperpolarizedDe221.
mocracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 278-79 (2011).

222.
since the
223.
224.

Ideology of appointing presidents has predicted Justices' agreements better than ever
1970s. See Chabot, supra note 10, at 1262 & fig.2.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 269 (dubbing the Supreme Court a "political court").
§ 1.
2; see also U.S. CONST. art. 111,
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.

Carolyn Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality and Confessing Subjectivity in Supreme Court
225.
Confirmation Hearings,88 CHI-KENT L. REV. 455, 465 (2013).
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226
dent-based"
arguments.
have also
been
known 227
to "expressly
disclaim . . . personal
policyJustices
preferences"
in their
opinions.

Beyond appearances, many Supreme Court decisions defy political
explanation. 22 8 Since the 1940s the Court has decided "[albout 29 percent" of "orally argued decisions" unanimously.

229

Just last term the per-

centage of unanimous decisions spiked to 66%. 23 In unanimous cases,
Justices appointed by Republicans and Democrats, and who have staked
out as ideologically distant positions as Justice Sonia Sotomayor and
Justice Clarence Thomas, nevertheless agree on the same case outcome.
Thus, it is not surprising that "ideology" has been found to play "only a
small role in unanimous decisions. 23'
Even non-unanimous decisions, which no doubt reflect a "substantial ideology effect,, 232 still leave room for explanatory factors other than
Justices' expected political preferences. 233 In recent decades, for example, ideology of appointing presidents has gained statistically significant
23 4
predictive power over Justices' agreements in non-unanimous cases.
But variation in ideology of appointing presidents (along with variation
in ideology of Senates to whom Justices were nominated) explains only
17% of the variation in Justices' rates of agreement.235
Beyond predictors of Justices' votes, Justices' actual voting alignments also provide evidence of ideologically independent voting. For
example, Justice John Paul Stevens's general voting record places him at
the far left of the Court's ideological spectrum, whereas Justice Antonin
Scalia has a conservative voting record that places him at the opposite
end of the spectrum. 236 Justices Stevens and Scalia nevertheless voted
226.
Cross, supra note 6, at 260, 325.
227.
Id. at 261 (quoting Justice Stevens' disclaimer of ideological reasons for the decision in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
228.
See generally Solum, supra note 117, at 2487-88 ("[R]esults reported in Behavior of
FederalJudges make it clear that a purely ideological model does not fare well at any level, even the
United States Supreme Court. The data strongly suggest that law and legal preferences play an

important role in explaining judicial behavior.").
229.
EPSTEIN, LANDES, & POSNER, supra note 117, at 124.
230.
Kedar S. Bhatia, Stat Pack for the October Term 2013, SCOTUSBLoG 5 (July 3, 2014)
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/SCOTUSblogStat Pack for OT13.pdf, Kedar Bhatia, A Few Notes on
Unanimity, SCOTUSBLOG (July 10, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/a-fewnotes-on-unanimity (noting that the Court's resolution of 38% of cases in 9-0 opinions without any
concurrence was also higher than in previous years).
231.
EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 117, at 136; Solum, supra note 117, at 2477.
232.
EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 117, at 149.
233.
Chabot, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 1013-14.

234.
235.

Chabot, supra note 10, at 1261-62 & fig.2.
Id. at 1261 fig.2, 1272 App. B (reporting Adj. R2d =.1724 in column 2).

236.

See Randy Schutt, Graph of Martin-Quinn Scores of Supreme Court Justices 1937-Now,

WIKMEDIA COMMONS (Sept. 17, 2014), http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Graphof MartinQuinn Scores of SupremeCourt Justices_1937-Now.png. For more information about MartinQuinn scores, see Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlofor the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
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together in a non-trivial 43% of non-unanimous cases.237 Indeed, ideologically "disordered" voting coalitions, with extremes such as a Stevens-Thomas or Scalia-Souter-Ginsburg dissent,238 are not uncommon:
Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist identify significant numbers of ideologically disordered votes in non-unanimous cases. 239 They conclude "unexpected voting patterns are frequently caused by other considerations
' 240
outweighing ideology in the thinking of at least some Justices.
Justices have cast surprisingly independent votes even in high profile cases. Take Justice Roberts's decision to vote with the liberal bloc of
the Court and uphold the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.241 Roberts's
decision was surprising because he parted company with Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and Kennedy and was the only Republican appointee to
find the Act's mandate constitutional.242 Roberts's decision has been
explained in legal and institutional terms that transcend basic political
inclinations. 243
No matter what the theoretical explanation for judicial independence, it is a trait that has been significantly associated with going to law
school. 244 Thus, one should pause before assuming a Justice who lacks
formal legal education will maintain current levels of judicial independence. It is difficult to imagine a candidate who has not formally studied
the role of precedent, for example, explaining to the Senate how she will
follow it, much less skillfully incorporating precedent into an opinion.
And, based on what happened in the past, one should not expect Justices
without formal legal education to do as well seeking or reaching politically independent grounds for agreement with their colleagues. Proposals
to enhance the Court's professional diversity should account for this
study's significant link between diverse professional training and enhanced political voting.

237.
238.

Chabot, supra note 10, at 1248 (discussing voting records through 2009).
Edelman, Klein & Lindquist, supra note 191, 834-35 tbl.3.

239. Id. at 830 tbl.i (noting ideologically ordered voting, by select natural court, in only 3657% of all non-unanimous cases).
240. Id. at 843.
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
241.
Id.
242.
243.
Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 86 (2012)
(accepting accounts of Roberts's opinion as "institutionalist and as resisting government compulsion"); Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: "Reasonable Interpretation" and the Affordable
Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118 (2012) (arguing that Roberts "transcended . . . polarized
political debates" through "analytical convergence" and the "law"); Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB
v. Sebelius Affects the ConstitutionalGestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 55 (2013) (noting that Roberts's opinion reflects his ability to see both dominant and alternative constitutional gestalts).
244. See supra note 185 and Figure 2.
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CONCLUSION

This study links diverse educational backgrounds to two significant
differences in how Justices voted. Justices who shared the benefit of
formal legal education (1) voted together more often and (2) were less
politically predictable than other Justices without this background. Proponents of Justices without formal legal education should recognize that
educational diversity has been associated with greater levels of politically predictable voting in the past.245 This enhanced political voting may
occur even if a Justice without formal legal education sits with other Justices who attended law school.246
Advocates of a more politically responsive Court should generally
find Justices without formal legal education desirable. In the past they
reflected views of their appointing presidents more closely than other
Justices. These findings suggest another critique of the appointments
process for advocates of a strong executive role.247 By limiting presidents
to a pool of candidates with formal legal education, the appointments
process impedes presidents' ability to update and shape the Court's political views.
On the other hand, appointing a Justice without formal legal training
should not be understood to promote optimal diversity in a purely neutral
manner. It should also be understood to have an important potential side
effect: enhanced political voting. Complete professional diversity should
be expected to improve decision making only if one considers enhanced
political voting an improvement.
This study considers one type of diversity in professional training
that is no longer present on the Court. Future studies might expand the
inquiry to consider how educational and professional diversity relate to a
wider array of judicial behavior. Are judges with certain backgrounds
more likely to apply particular legal doctrines or favor formalism or
pragmatism in judging?
These future inquiries can help identify differences associated with
enhanced professional and educational diversity on the bench, as well as
the normative goals diversity is likely to serve. For now, however, formal
legal education is associated with significant differences in how Supreme
Court Justices voted. Justices who attended law school voted together
more often and less politically than Justices without the same educational
background. A Court including Justices without formal legal education
should not be expected to maintain the same level of political independence as a Court comprised entirely of Justices who attended law school.

245.
246.
247.

See supra note 185 and Figure 2.
See supra note 185 and Figure 2.
See McGinnis, supra note 28, at 667; Stone, supra note 12, at 460.
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APPENDIX A:

A. Explanatory Variables: CalculationofAbsolute DistanceBetween
Appointing Presidents' D W-NOMINA TE Scores(POLDIST)
As noted in Part II, above, proximity of two Justices' political inclinations was calculated using the absolute distance between their appointing presidents' DW-NOMINATE scores. This section provides a detailed
description of DW-NOMINATE scores used in the study.
The DW-NOMINATE scores rank presidents from liberal to conservative on a scale of-I to + 1. They are derived from roll call votes cast
by each member of Congress and are comparable across different Congresses. The scores rank presidents in equivalent terms based on the positions presidents take on particular congressional roll call votes.
For the historical time period covered here, it is important to consider both dimensions of liberal and conservative ideology represented
by DW-NOMINATE scores.248 The first dimension addresses the "basic
issue of the role of government in the economy., 249 The second dimension picks "up regional differences within the United States," 250 often
accounting for issues of race or other dimensions, which may divide
251
members of the same party.
To account for both dimensions, the study incorporates a combined
DW-NOMINATE score. It assigns each dimension the weight recommended by their authors. First dimension scores receive a weight of 1
and second dimension scores receive a weight of 0.4638. 252 For Justices
who were elevated to Chief Justice while serving as Associate Justices,
uses DW-NOMINATE
such as Chief Justice Edward White, the study
253
Court.
the
to
nomination
initial
scores for the

248.

See, e.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC

HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 129 (1997). Historical DW-NOMINATE scores for presidents are
VOTEVIEW.COM,
generally
See
of observations.
numbers
limited
on
based
http://www.voteview.com/ (last visited Oct. 1I,2014). They nevertheless remain the best available
metrics of presidential ideology beyond party.
249. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Party Polarization:1879-2010,
VOTEVIEW.COM (Jan. 11,2011), http://voteview.com/polarized america.htm.
250. Id.
POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 248, at 232.
251.
Keith Poole et al., "Common-Space" DW-NOMINATE Scores with BootstrappedStand252.
ard Errors (Joint House and Senate Scaling), VOTEVIEW.COM (Jan. 22, 2011),
http://www.voteview.com/dwnomjoint.asp.
The study makes a further adjustment for Charles Evans Hughes. Hughes originally
253.
served as an Associate Justice but then left the Court to run for president in 1916. See 3 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT INUNITED STATES HISTORY 448-49 (1924). He was later appointed
Chief Justice in 1930. Id. Because there are DW-NOMINATE scores for only Hughes's initial
appointment, the study uses these scores for both of Hughes's terms on the bench.
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B. Control Variables
As noted in Part II, the study includes several control variables.
These variables reflect alternative explanations for variation in Justices'
agreements. The sections below describe control variables used in the
study.
1. Fixed Effects Variables Control for Varied Norms of Consensus
The study uses fixed effects dummy variables to control for generally inflated rates of agreement due to norms of consensus. Justices are
thought to have publicly suppressed private disagreements, and joined
unanimous opinions with which they did not personally agree, more frequently in part of the period covered by this study.254
Although Justices originally issued their opinions seriatim, Chief
Justice John Marshall used his leadership skills to convince Justices to
abandon this practice and join a single opinion of the Court.25 5 This pattern of unanimity held during the remainder of the nineteenth century
and into the twentieth century. 6 High levels of unanimity continued
through the 1920s, eroded somewhat after the Judiciary Act of 1925, and
257
gave way to sharply increased rates of dissent by the 1940s.
Thus, it is possible that high rates of agreement between some Justices in the study relate to historical norms of consensus, which operate
independently of Justices' educational backgrounds. 258 This study sidesteps much of the concern by excluding unanimous decisions. The nonunanimous cases studied here are those in which at least one Justice violated consensual norms by dissenting.

254.
See Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note 147, at 362-63; Post, supra note 171, at 1335
fig. 18; see generally Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of
Consensus Voting, 54 J.L. & ECON. 781 (2011) (developing "a consensus voting model for estimating preferences of federal circuit court judges").
255.
John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the UnitedStates Supreme Court 17901945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 166 (1999); M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and
Back Again: A Theory of Dissent 21 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 186, 2008) (citing 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919) and
William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court "The First Hundred Years Were the Hardest," 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 475, 480-81 (1988)), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract_id=1019074.
256.
Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note 147, at 362.
257.
Id. at 365; Post, supra note 171, at 1310 & fig.10. The Court's ability to hear a greater
percentage of politically salient cases under the 1925 Judiciary Act may have also contributed to
increased rates of dissent. Halpem & Vines, supra note 147, at 480 (discussing how, in addition to
wider discretionary jurisdiction, the Act eliminated appeals as of right in many "uncontroversial
cases" and "freed the [C]ourt to concentrate in obligatory appeals on only those cases raising salient
national issues"). See generally Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936-42. To the extent
this change in jurisdiction was followed by stronger patterns of politically predictable voting, it is
accounted for in the interaction variable comparing changes in political voting before and after 1925.
See infra Appendix A at Part C.
258.
Alternatively, it may be that Justices who share the same background in formal legal
education adhere to norms of consensus more strongly.
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Still, pressure to agree with one's colleagues could influence voting
patterns in non-unanimous cases. Even when one Justice dissented, other
Justices may have still felt pressure to join a majority decision. A 5-4
decision sends a different message than an 8-1 decision, and may have
been perceived as less legitimate in at least part of the period studied
here.25 9 Thus, it is possible that some Justices in the study had generally
inflated agreement rates and suppressed political voting due to historical
norms of consensus.
This study controls for inflated agreement rates by including Justice-level fixed effects dummy variables. 6 ° The fixed effects measure
variation in each Justice's rates of agreement by calculating a unique
starting point (or intercept) for each Justice. The unique starting point
adjusts for generally inflated agreement rates. It allows analysis to focus
on whether intra-Justice variation in agreement rates is significantly explained by differences in proximity of political inclinations, educational
backgrounds, or other control variables. Because these variables calculate a unique starting point for each Justice in the study, they are not reported in graphical depictions of results above.
2. Professional Experience
a. Same Judicial Experience (JU_EX)
Scholars have frequently hypothesized "how [prior] judicial experience may influence attitudes about case outcomes., 26' Although prior
judicial experience has not been consistently associated with judges'
voting patterns, Tate and Handberg's historical study finds that it has
some explanatory power over Supreme Court decisions in economics
cases. 262 Thus this study will also account for its possible explanatory
power.
This study uses "JU_EX" as a dummy variable identifying differences or similarities in Justices' prior experience as judges. Pairs of Justices who both had prior experience as judges at the federal or state level
received a 1, all other pairs received a 0.263

259.
See Post, supra note 171, at 1315-17 (discussing Brandeis' concern with dissent in light
of legislation proposed by Senator Borah, which would have required at least 7 members of the
Court to agree to "any decision invalidating an Act of Congress").

260. The study included the fixed effects specification by hand coding binary fixed effects
dummy variables for each Justice and adding them to data used in the regression.
261.
See George, supra note 1,at 1354-55, 1362-63 (describing past studies and hypothesizing
how prior experience may influence decision making on the Roberts's Court).
262. Tate & Handberg,supra note 16, 474 tbl.l.
263.
See Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19. Variables 81-96 describe place
and dates a Justice served on a state trial or appellate court, or federal district court or court of appeals.
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b. Same Prosecutorial Experience (PROEX)
Many studies hypothesize that prosecutorial experience "will influence the ideological direction of judges' decisions. '2 6 These judges may
tend to favor government interests in cases against criminal defendants,
6
as well as other types of cases . 265
Or their experience prosecuting underdogs or have-nots may make them generally more conservative than
judges without prosecutorial experience. 266 Prosecutorial experience has
been found to predict Justices' rulings in historical civil rights and liberties and economics cases,267 so it is important to consider its explanatory
power here.
This study uses "PRO EX" as a dummy variable identifying differences or similarities in Justices' experience as prosecutors or government
attorneys. Pairs of Justices who both had this experience received a 1, all
other pairs received a 0.268 Although some studies measuring outcomes
in criminal cases have focused narrowly on judges with experience as a
criminal prosecutor, 269 this study looks to all types of cases. Thus it considers experience in both criminal and civil cases where a Justice has past
experience representing the government. 270
3. Personal Attributes
a. Same High Economic Status (ECON)
Familial economic status has not been generally thought or found to
explain Justices' voting patterns in historical or other cases. 27 Still, it
seems a possible alternative explanation for higher rates of agreement.
Perhaps Justices who grew up in a more affluent environment, with
greater amounts of property to protect, valued property rights more than
Justices from less wealthy backgrounds.
This study uses "ECON" as a dummy variable identifying differences or similarities in Justices' family economic status. Pairs of Justices

264.

George, supra note 1,at 1353.

265. Id. at 1354; Nagel, supra note 17, at 266 tbl. 1.
266. George, supra note 1,at 1354; Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 474 tbl. I (prosecutorial
service was negatively correlated with liberal votes in civil rights and economics cases, but the effect
was mitigated for prosecutors who also had judicial experience).
267. Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 474 tbl. I, 474-76.
268. Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19. Variables 145-159 record place and
dates of experience representing local or state government interests: deputy or city attorney, assistant
district or county attorney, district or county attorney, state assistant attorney general or state attorney general. Variables 97-110 record place and dates of experience representing federal government
interests: Assistant U.S. Attorney or U.S. Attorney, work in the office of or as Solicitor General, and
work in the office of or as Attorney General.
269. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 1473.
270.

See Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19.

271.

Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 476; Tate, supra note 14, at 358.
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whose families were both upper to upper-middle class received a 1, all
other pairs received a 0.272
b. Same Non-Urban Origins (NON-URBAN)
Justices from rural and urban origins may also vote differently.
and Handberg's historical study measured whether Justices from
urban, agricultural backgrounds voted more conservatively in both
rights and economics cases.273 They identified a significant negative
tionship between this background variable and liberal votes in both
rights and liberties and economics cases.274

Tate
noncivil
relacivil

This study uses "NONURBAN" as a dummy variable identifying
differences or similarities in Justices' childhood surroundings. Pairs of
surroundings were non-urban received a 1, all
Justices whose childhood
271
0.
a
received
pairs
other
c. Originated From Same Geographic Region (REG)
A final factor that may explain Justices' agreements is common regional origin. Tate and Handberg found Justices from the South voted
considerably more conservatively in civil rights and liberties cases but
not in economics cases. 276
This study incorporates "REG" as a dummy variable identifying dif-I
ferences or similarities in Justices' regional origins. Pairs of Justices who
were both from Northern states or both from Southern states received a
1, all other pairs received a 0.277
C. Interaction Variables
As noted in Part II, supra, the study interacts political inclinations
with the FORMAL ED dummy and with a dummy identifying Justices
appointed after 1925. This interaction identifies whether Justices who
both went to law school or Justices appointed after 1925 vote more or
less politically than other Justices. The sections below provide more detail on these interactions.
272.
Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19. Variable 18, Family economic status.
For this variable, scores 5 and 4 represent upper to upper-middle class family status. Justices who
both had scores of 4 or 5 received a 1. Any pair with a Justice from a middle to lower class family
status (scores 3-1) received a zero.
273.
Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 468. Their study identifies agricultural background
according to whether the Justice had a father who was a farmer. Id.
274. Id. at 474 tbl. 1.
Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19. Variable 17. For this variable Justices
275.
with urban childhood surroundings were coded as 5s. Justices in more rural childhood surroundings
were coded as Is through 4s. Thus, both Justices had to have a score of 4 or less to receive a "1"
dummy for this variable.
276. Tate & Handberg, supra note 16, at 474 tbl. I.
Epstein et al., JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 19 (variable 16, nominee's childhood
277.
location). The study uses a strict definition of Southern states and did not count border states, such as
Maryland, as the South.
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1. Political Inclinations and Justices Who Both Attended Law

School
The second regression interacts proximity of political inclinations
and educational backgrounds. The regression multiplies the
FORMALED dummy by the variable for proximity of Justices' political
inclinations, POL DIST.278 The interaction between these variables
measures whether there is a significant difference between predictive
power of political inclinations for two groups of Justices:
(1) pairs of Justices with one or more Justice who did not attend law
school; and
279
(2) pairs of Justices who both attended law school.

The interaction coefficient reported by the regression allows calculation of the total predictive power of political inclinations for Justices
who both attended law school.28 °
2. Political Inclinations for Justices Appointed Before and After
1925
The first regression uses an interaction to account for the fact that
later appointed Justices may have had greater opportunities to hear politically salient cases than earlier appointed Justices. The Judiciary Act of
1925 gave the Court greater discretion to decide politically salient cases
than before.281 Discretionary review by writ of certiorari replaced much
of the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction and "essentially recog282
nized the Court as the supervisor of the system of federal law."

278.
See supra text accompanying note 179.
279.
If the effect of distance between political inclinations changes for Justices who both
attended law school, it will show up in the data as a significant coefficient on the interaction variable. To see this, note the expected change in agreement rate for a change in political distance is the
general POLDIST coefficient for pairs where the dummy variable is equal to zero and the
POLDIST coefficient plus the POL DIST*FORMALED interaction coefficient during the time
periods the dummy variable is equal to one. A formal test of the null hypothesis that the predictive
power of political inclinations did not change is therefore equivalent to a test of the null hypothesis
that the POL DIST coefficient = POL DIST coefficient + POL DIST*FORMALED interaction
coefficient, or that the POL DIST interaction coefficient = 0.
280.
To accomplish this I add the coefficient for group (I) to the interaction coefficient for
group (2). Thus, total predictive power of political inclinations for Justices who both attended law
school equals the sum of group I plus group 2. 1 also needed to calculate new confidence intervals
for sum of two coefficients. This involved a multi-step process. First, Variance(13, + O) = Variance(P.) + Variance(Ob) + 2*Co-variance(13, + b). See generally JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE,
INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 140-41 (5th ed. 2008). The standard
error is the square root of this estimated variance, and the t-stat is (13.+ Ob) - 0/standard error. The tstat can then be converted into a p-value, which reflects confidence intervals reported in this study.
281.
See Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936-42.
282.
Post, supra note 171, at 1273; see also Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein & William J.
Dixon, On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J.
POLS. 361, 385 (1988) (concluding that multiple factors including Chief Justice Stone's ineffectual
leadership and change to discretionary jurisdiction contributed to decline of consensual norms on the

Court).
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Changes in mandatory appellate jurisdiction are also thought to have
freed the Court from "uncontroversial" appeals and allowed it to focus
on appeals "raising salient national issues. 2 83 Thus, different opportunities to resolve politically divisive cases before and after 1925, rather than
common educational background, may explain voting by some Justices
in the study. To account for this possibility, the study adds a time dummy
variable to identify the distinct explanatory power attributable to political
inclinations in the post-1925 time period.
The post-1925 time dummy accounts for voting records of Justices
appointed after 1925. The time dummy allows consideration of two different groups of Justices: Justices appointed through 1925 (Justice
Swayne through Justice Stone) and Justices appointed after 1925 (Justice
Black through Justice Jackson). This dummy controls for politically predictable voting limited to a set of later-appointed Justices.
It codes each dummy variable according to a single Justice's paired
agreements with all other Justices with whom he sits. For example, the
data includes agreement rates for Justice Sutherland and all other Justices
with whom he sits, then agreement rates for Justice Reed and all other
Justices with whom he sits, etc. I assign a 1 or 0 according to the first
Justice in the pair, so that the pairs for Justice Reed, who was appointed
after 1925, receive a 1, and the pairs for Justice Sutherland, who was
appointed before 1925, receive a 0.
The regression multiplies the POST_1925 time dummy by the variable representing proximity of Justices'
political inclinations
(POLDIST).284 Again, the interaction between these variables measures
whether there is a significant difference between predictive power of
political inclinations over agreement rates for Justices appointed in distinct time periods. The interaction coefficient reported by the regression
is used to calculate the total predictive power of political inclinations for
Justices appointed in the post-1925 time period.

283.
284.

Halpern & Vines, supra note 147, at 480.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS

Explanatory Variable
Proximate Political Inclinations (All
Justices)

-0.0322

[0.0322]

Proximate Political Inclinations, one
or more Justices Did Not Attend
Law School
Difference in Prox. Pol. Inclinations
for Justices Appointed Post-1925

-0.0066

[.04061

Total Level Prox. Pol. Inclinations
for Justices Appointed Post-1925

-0.0388

[0.0262]

0.0401**

[0.0182]

Both Justices=Formal Legal Ed
Difference in Proximate Political
Inclinations For Justices Who Both
Attended Law School
Total Level Proximate Political
Inclinations For Justices Who Both
Attended Law School

n/a

n/a

0.0784**

[0.03561

0.0681**

[0.023]

-0.0103

[0.0247]

Judicial Experience

0.0137

[0.0121

0.019

[0.0122]

Prosecutorial Experience

0.0197

[0.0148]

0.0203

[0.0146]

Economic Status

0.0036

[0.0161]

0.0036

[0.0162]

Non-Urban Origins

-0.0103

[0.01571

-0.009

[0.016]

Regional Origins

-0.0073

[0.0115]

-0.0039

[0.01231

Adj. R2d

N

.1939

.2016

551

551

Column I reports results depicted in Figure 1,285 Column II reports
results depicted in Figure 2.286 ** denotes p<0.05; p-values are estimated
with clustered standard errors, which are reported in brackets.

285.
286.

See supra note 184.
See supra note 185.

